Last Week in Antitrust Litigation (#054)
- Kressin Powers
- 4 days ago
- 7 min read
Week of March 23, 2026
Top Takeaways
Section 1 Enforcement Targets Anti-Steering and Network Design: United States v. NYP continues a line of cases challenging dominant-provider contracting restrictions that foreclose narrow networks and tiered pricing mechanisms under rule-of-reason analysis.
Parallel Conduct and Bundling Theories Extend Across Markets: HVAC and ski-pass cases reflect increasing reliance on coordinated pricing and tying theories in both commodity and platform-adjacent consumer markets.
Judicial Gatekeeping on Market Participation and Injury: Decisions in Helena World Chronicle, Branch Metrics, and MLS-related litigation reinforce strict application of antitrust standing and market-definition requirements, distinguishing direct competitive harm from indirect supplier or consumer injury.
New Cases Filed
Berg v. Robert Bosch LLC (E.D. Mich. Mar. 20, 2026): Plaintiff filed a putative class action against multiple HVAC equipment manufacturers alleging that defendants conspired to fix, raise, and maintain prices for HVAC equipment in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act and related state laws. The complaint alleges that defendants coordinated price increases through trade associations, industry meetings, and public signaling, exchanged competitively sensitive information, and used common industry channels to announce and reinforce parallel price hikes while restricting output and maintaining “price discipline.” According to plaintiff, this conduct enabled defendants to inflate prices above competitive levels beginning in 2020, resulting in sustained supracompetitive pricing in a highly concentrated market with inelastic demand and limited substitutes, thereby harming indirect purchasers.
Goloja v. Vail Resorts, Inc. (D. Colo. Mar. 23, 2026): Plaintiffs filed a putative class action against Vail Resorts and Alterra Mountain Company alleging unlawful tying and bundling of ski lift access products in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act and related state laws. The complaint alleges that defendants bundle access to destination ski resorts with regional ski areas through multi-resort season passes while simultaneously charging supracompetitive prices for standalone lift tickets to coerce consumers into purchasing the bundled passes, thereby foreclosing independent competitors and restricting consumer choice. According to plaintiffs, this conduct leverages defendants’ dominance over destination ski resorts to raise prices and degrade quality through overcrowding and reduced competition in regional markets.
United States v. N.Y. & Presbyterian Hosp. (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 2026): The United States filed suit against The New York and Presbyterian Hospital alleging that it imposed anticompetitive contractual restrictions on health insurers that prevent the offering of cost-conscious insurance plans in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act. The complaint alleges that the hospital used its market power to require insurers to include it in networks on favored terms and to prohibit plan designs that steer patients to lower-cost competitors, thereby blocking narrow networks, tiered plans, and other pricing mechanisms that promote competition. According to the United States, this conduct suppresses competition among hospitals, maintains supracompetitive prices for inpatient services, and limits consumer choice in the New York City healthcare market.
The follow-on cases that were filed are:
City of Santa Barbara v. REV Grp. (C.D. Cal. Mar. 20, 2026) (alleging defendants conspired to inflate the price of fire trucks like in City of La Crosse v. Oshkosh Corp. (E.D. Wis. Aug. 20, 2025))
Morton v. NCAA (N.D. Ga. Mar. 23, 2026) (alleging NCAA’s eligibility rules are anticompetitive like in Elad v. NCAA (D.N.J. Mar. 20, 2025))
Keanaaina v. NCAA (D. Colo. Mar. 26, 2026) (same)
Jason Buckman Farms, LLC v. Canpotex Ltd. (W.D. Mo. Mar. 23, 2026) (alleging defendants conspired to fix the price of fertilizers like in Stevens v. Nutrien AG Sols. (N.D. Ill. Mar. 7, 2026))
Wendelken Farms LC v. Koch Fertilizer, LLC (D. Kan. Mar. 26, 2026) (same)
Dispositive Orders and Verdicts
Branch Metrics Inc. v. Google LLC (E.D. Tex. Mar. 19, 2026): In this case alleging Google has foreclosed competing Android application search technologies from getting distribution with manufacturers and wireless carriers, the court denied Google’s motion to dismiss. As to the antitrust claims, the court reasoned that (a) plaintiff plausibly alleged antitrust standing by asserting it was a direct target and competitor or nascent competitor harmed by Google’s exclusionary conduct across the defined markets, and (b) the complaint adequately alleged tying and anticompetitive effects by asserting how Google’s conduct impacts competitors and app developers.
Compass, Inc. v. Nw. Multiple Listing Serv. (W.D. Wash. Mar. 19, 2026): In this case alleging defendant’s adoption and enforcement of rules that blocked plaintiffs’ private exclusive listings and ultimately terminated their access to critical MLS data feeds violated the Sherman Act, the court denied defendant’s motion to dismiss. The court reasoned that (a) the complaint plausibly alleged an unreasonable restraint of trade under the rule of reason by identifying relevant markets and alleging reduced quality, diminished consumer choice, and suppression of innovative brokerage services, (b) plaintiff plausibly alleged antitrust injury because the challenged rules harmed competition by restricting marketing options for sellers and limiting competitive entry, and (c) the same allegations supported a plausible monopolization claim and related state-law claims, with factual disputes regarding procompetitive justifications and market structure inappropriate for resolution at the pleading stage.
Helena World Chronicle, LLC v. Google LLC (D.D.C. Mar. 20, 2026): In this case alleging monopolization, tying, and unlawful acquisitions in violation of Sherman Act and Clayton Act in the markets for general search services and online news based on Google’s use of its search dominance to exploit publishers’ content and expand into news and generative AI, the court granted Google’s motion to dismiss. The court reasoned that (a) plaintiffs lacked antitrust standing in the general search market because their alleged injuries as content suppliers and publishers were indirect and occurred outside the market where competition was allegedly restrained, (b) plaintiffs failed to plausibly allege monopoly power in the online news market due to flawed market-share calculations and insufficient barriers to entry, and (c) the tying and acquisition claims failed because no coercive purchase arrangement was alleged and the merger challenges were time-barred without plausible continuing-violation or tolling theories.
In re Telescopes Antitrust Litig. (N.D. Cal. Mar. 23, 2026): In this indirect purchaser class action alleging price-fixing of consumer telescopes, the court granted summary judgment in part for certain defendants on statute of limitations grounds. The court reasoned that (a) the continuing-conspiracy doctrine does not apply to mergers because an acquisition is a discrete act that cannot restart the limitations period, (b) plaintiffs failed to produce evidence of lack of knowledge required to establish fraudulent concealment and were at least on constructive notice of their claims based on publicly available information, and (c) as a result, claims based on the 2013 acquisition were time-barred while other aspects of the case required further briefing.
Broad River Elec. Coop, v. Gaffney Bd. of Pub. Works (D.S.C. Mar. 23, 2026): In this case alleging monopolization and unlawful tying in violation of, among others, the Sherman Act and Clayton Act § 3 in the markets for electric and sewer services based on a municipal utility’s alleged conditioning of sewer service on the purchase of electric service, the court granted in part and denied in part the motion to dismiss, dismissing the Clayton Act claim but allowing the Sherman Act claim to proceed. The court reasoned that (a) plaintiff plausibly alleged antitrust standing and a Section 2 claim based on allegations that defendant leveraged a monopoly in sewer services to foreclose competition in the electric market, (b) the Clayton Act tying claim failed because sewer service is not a qualifying “commodity” and therefore did not involve two distinct products under the statute, and (c) dismissal on Parker immunity and state-law grounds was premature because factual development was required to determine whether the challenged conduct was authorized by state policy.
Batton v. Compass, Inc. (N.D. Ill. Mar. 24, 2026): In this case alleging a conspiracy in violation of, among others, the Sherman Act and related state antitrust laws in the market for buyer-agent brokerage services based on rules promulgated by the National Association of Realtors that allegedly inflate commissions nationwide, the court granted in part defendants’ motion to dismiss. The court reasoned that (a) plaintiffs plausibly alleged a horizontal agreement through defendants’ collective adoption and enforcement of NAR rules sufficient to state a § 1 claim and avoid improper group pleading, (b) antitrust standing for injunctive relief failed because homebuyers did not face a sufficient likelihood of future injury, and (c) various state-law claims were dismissed or limited based on statutory requirements, including lack of deceptive conduct, non-retroactivity, or class-action restrictions, while other claims survived and statute-of-limitations defenses were deferred under continuing-violation and fraudulent-concealment theories.
BNI Franchising v. Network for Action Intl. (S.D. Tex. Mar. 24, 2026): In this case alleging monopolization and attempted monopolization in violation of the Sherman Act and the Texas Antitrust Act in the market for business networking and referral services, the court granted the motion to dismiss the antitrust counterclaims The court reasoned that (a) although the counterclaim plausibly alleged a product market and some indicia of monopoly power, it failed to adequately plead a geographic market and antitrust injury because it did not show harm to competition or consumers, (b) the alleged exclusive-dealing and noncompete arrangements were not sufficiently pleaded as exclusionary conduct under the rule of reason and the sham-litigation theory was inadequately supported, and (c) because the federal § 2 claims failed, the parallel state antitrust claim was also dismissed without prejudice.
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