Last Week in Antitrust Litigation (#051)
- Kressin Powers
- Mar 8
- 5 min read
Week of March 2, 2026
Top Takeaways
Control of Data and Infrastructure Faces Antitrust Scrutiny: New suits against CUSIP Global and Hudl highlight rising challenges to companies that control essential market infrastructure—from securities identifiers required for capital markets access to sports video data platforms relied on by schools and leagues.
Courts Continue Tight Screening of Antitrust Claims: Multiple decisions dismissed claims lacking clear market definitions, antitrust standing, or plausible evidence of exclusionary conduct, reinforcing rigorous pleading standards at the motion-to-dismiss stage.
Conspiracy Allegations Survive When Supported by Market Evidence: In the generic drug MDL, the court allowed several claims to proceed where plaintiffs alleged parallel price increases supported by communications and other “plus factors,” underscoring the continuing importance of circumstantial evidence in cartel cases.
New Cases Filed
Glob. Infrastructure Fin. & Dev. Auth. Inc. v. CUSIP Glob. Servs. (M.D. Pa. Feb. 27, 2026): Global Infrastructure Finance and Development Authority filed suit against CUSIP Global and FactSet Research Systems alleging monopolization, attempted monopolization, and unlawful refusal to deal in the market for securities identification numbers required for access to U.S. capital markets in violation of, among others, Section 2 of the Sherman Act. The complaint alleges that Defendants, as the sole provider of CUSIP identifiers, refused to activate CUSIP numbers for Plaintiff’s state-authorized bond issuances after initially accepting applications, assigning identifiers, and confirming compliance, while continuing to issue identifiers to other similarly situated issuers. According to Plaintiff, this conduct excludes its securities from U.S. capital markets, forecloses competition in downstream infrastructure financing, and maintains Defendants’ monopoly power over an essential facility required for trading and settlement.
Qwikcut, LLC v. Agile Sports Techs., Inc. (D.N.J. Mar. 5, 2026): QwikCut filed suit against Agile Sports Technologies (d/b/a Hudl) alleging monopolization and attempted monopolization of the market for sports video and data for school programs and athletic departments in violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act. The complaint alleges that Hudl acquired competing platforms, entered exclusive agreements with athletic associations and coaching clinics, imposed exclusionary pricing and bundling practices, and constructed technological barriers—including cross-platform video transfers and API access—to prevent interoperability and foreclose rival platforms. According to the complaint, these practices lock schools into Hudl’s platform, prevent rivals from accessing essential game film exchanges, and enable Hudl to maintain monopoly power while charging supracompetitive prices and degrading service and innovation.
The follow-on cases that were filed are:
Coughlan v. Angeion Grp. LLC (D.N.J. Feb. 27, 2026) (alleging conspiracy to inflate class action administration costs and suppress payouts to class members like in Tejon v. Epiq Sys., Inc. (S.D. Fl. May 29, 2025))
Dispositive Orders and Verdicts
Tommy’s Towing, LLC v. Candido’s Inc. (E.D. Ky. Apr. 9, 2025): In this case alleging a conspiracy to monopolize and attempt to monopolize the market for towing services, the court granted the Kentucky State Police and two officers’ motion to dismiss without prejudice. The court reasoned that (a) the complaint failed to plead sufficient factual detail to plausibly allege a Sherman Act claim, and (b) although state-action immunity under Parker v. Brown was not resolved on the pleadings, the antitrust claim independently failed for lack of plausible factual support.
In re Generic Pharms. Pricing Antitrust Litig. (E.D. Pa. Mar. 2, 2026): In this MDL alleging price-fixing of generic drugs, the court granted in part Epic Pharma LLC’s Rule 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss several complaints. The court found that (a) several complaints plausibly alleged Epic’s participation in a conspiracy through parallel price increases and communications with competitors combined with plus factors such as market concentration, barriers to entry, and actions against self-interest, and (b) other complaints failed to plausibly connect Epic to the alleged conspiracy because they alleged only price increases or generalized industry conduct without factual allegations tying Epic to conspiratorial acts.
Am. Proteins, Inc. v. River Valley Ingredients, Inc. (N.D. Ga. Mar. 3, 2026): In this case alleging horizontal group boycott, monopolization, and conspiracy to monopolize in violation of the Sherman Act in the Southeast poultry rendering services market arising from Tyson’s exclusive raw-material supply agreements with Wayne Farms and Koch Foods, the court granted Tyson’s summary judgment motion while denying plaintiffs’ motion. The court reasoned that (a) the record did not support a horizontal boycott or hub-and-spoke conspiracy, and (b) plaintiffs failed to demonstrate antitrust injury or efficient-enforcer standing because their alleged losses from selling their business and lost profits did not flow from conduct prohibited by the antitrust laws and any downstream or upstream harms were better asserted by other market participants.
Loctar v. Spartan Concrete Prods., LLC (D.V.I. Mar. 4, 2026): In this case alleging market allocation in violation of Sherman Act § 1 and the Virgin Islands Antimonopoly Law in the market for ready-mix concrete in the U.S. Virgin Islands, the magistrate judge recommended denying defendants’ summary judgment motion as to Spartan Concrete Products and as to two counts against Mosler and granting summary judgment for Mosler on another. The court reasoned that (a) genuine disputes of material fact existed as to whether the statute of limitations was tolled under the fraudulent concealment doctrine, (b) the record did not establish as a matter of law that the plaintiff knew or should have known of the alleged conspiracy earlier despite observing price increases, and (c) while the Virgin Islands Antimonopoly Law does not provide personal liability for corporate agents, the separate common-law “participating agent” claim against Mosler could proceed because defendants failed to show it was not an independent cause of action.
Dynamic Healthcare Servs. v. Philips Med. Cap., LLC (E.D. Pa. Mar. 3, 2026): In this case alleging an anticompetitive boycott in the financing for U.S. respiratory medical industry, the court granted defendants’ motions to dismiss without prejudice. The court reasoned that (a) plaintiffs failed to establish antitrust standing because the complaint did not plausibly allege harm to competition or an injury of the type the antitrust laws were intended to prevent, (b) the allegations did not plausibly connect defendants’ financing decisions to an anticompetitive boycott or exclusionary conduct in the relevant market, and (c) the complaint relied on conclusory assertions of consumer harm.
Brandywine Hosp., LLC v. CVS Health Corp. (E.D. Pa. Mar. 3, 2026): In this case alleging illegal tying and monopolization in violation of Sherman Act §§ 1 and 2 in the markets for 340B contract pharmacy services and third-party administrator services, the court granted defendants’ motion to dismiss with prejudice. The court reasoned that (a) plaintiffs failed to plead a legally cognizable tying product market because their single-brand “CVS Contract Pharmacy Market” excluded reasonably interchangeable pharmacy providers, (b) plaintiffs likewise failed to define a proper tied product market or geographic market, and (c) personal jurisdiction over CVS Health was absent because plaintiffs did not establish that the corporation transacted business in the district or otherwise had sufficient contacts with Pennsylvania.
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