Last Week in Antitrust Litigation (#029)

Week of September 29, 2025

Top Takeaways

1. Big Names Under Fire: Meta, Zillow, and Aptar were hit with new lawsuits over alleged monopolistic tactics—showing that dominant tech and healthcare players remain squarely in the enforcement spotlight.

2. Judges Are Demanding More Proof: Recent dismissals in cases from LIBOR to eyewear demonstrate that courts expect concrete facts, not just theories—raising litigation risk for poorly supported claims.

3. Healthcare Stays a Hot Zone: From insulin pricing to patent settlements, enforcement and private suits continue to test how far pharmaceutical and medical device companies can push competitive limits.

New Cases Filed

Ollywan Ltd. v. Meta Platforms, Inc. (N.D. Cal. Sept. 26, 2025): Ollywan Limited filed a complaint against alleging monopolization and attempted monopolization through exclusionary conduct (including tying) in violation of, among others, Section 2 of the Sherman Act. According to the complaint, Meta allegedly copied Ollywan’s proprietary business plan, launched Instagram Shopping as a copycat product, tied its dominant social networking platform to its shopping service, and suppressed Ollywan’s competing Winstag app through discriminatory trademark enforcement and advertising restrictions. Plaintiffs contend this conduct reduced innovation, imposed supracompetitive fees on merchants, and deprived consumers of choice.

ARS Pharms. Operations., Inc. v. Aptargroup, Inc. (S.D. Cal. Sept. 29, 2025): ARS Pharmaceuticals filed a complaint against AptarGroup alleging unlawful tying, monopolization, and attempted monopolization in the markets for single-dose intranasal spray systems for emergency-use applications and FDA-approved rubber plungers for ARS’s epinephrine nasal spray neffy in violation of the Sherman Act. The complaint asserts that Aptar, the only FDA-approved supplier of rubber plungers for neffy, adopted new sales terms conditioning ARS’s ability to purchase plungers on also buying Aptar’s single-dose intranasal spray system at near-parity volumes, thereby foreclosing ARS from sourcing more systems from rival Silgan. ARS contends this conduct foreclosed competition, delayed Silgan’s entry, forced ARS to buy unwanted Aptar systems at inflated prices, and denied consumers the benefits of lower costs, stable supply, and innovation.

FTC v. Zillow Grp., Inc. (E.D. Va. Sept. 30, 2025): The FTC filed a complaint alleging Zillow and Redfin entered into an unlawful agreement and de facto acquisition to eliminate competition in the market for multifamily online rental listing service (“ILS”) advertising (properties of 25 units or more) in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, Section 7 of the Clayton Act, and Section 5 of the FTC Act. The FTC contends that Zillow paid Redfin $100 million to exit the multifamily ILS advertising business, terminate its contracts, transfer customers and sensitive information to Zillow, and agree not to compete for up to nine years. According to the FTC, this agreement unlawfully removed one of three national competitors, raised concentration in an already highly concentrated market, and will harm property managers and renters through higher prices, reduced quality, diminished innovation, and fewer choices.

Value Drug Co. v. Alkermes, Inc. (D. Mass. Oct. 2, 2025): Value Drug Company filed a putative class action against Alkermes, Inc. and Alkermes Pharma Ireland alleging an unlawful scheme to monopolize the market for injectable naltrexone (Vivitrol) in violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act. The complaint alleges Alkermes fraudulently obtained U.S. Patent No. 7,919,499 by concealing prior art, wrongfully listed it in the FDA’s Orange Book, filed sham Hatch-Waxman litigation to trigger a 30-month stay of generic approval, and entered anticompetitive settlements with generic manufacturers Amneal and Teva to delay generic entry. Plaintiff contends this conduct excluded lower-priced generic competition, enabling Alkermes to maintain supracompetitive prices and overcharge direct purchasers for Vivitrol.

The follow-on cases that were filed are:

• Walgreen Co. v. Biogen, Inc. (N.D. Ill. Sept. 26, 2025) (alleging Biogen engaged in an unlawful scheme to impair generic competition of MS drug like in Teamsters Local 237 Fund v. Biogen, Inc. (N.D. Ill. Sept. 27, 2024))

• Keel v. Charles Rutenberg Realty, Inc. (W.D. Mo. Sept. 26, 2025) (alleging conspiracy to fix and raise prices of real estate commissions like in QJ Team, LLC v. Tex. Ass’n of Realtors, Inc. (E.D. Tex. Nov. 13, 2023))

• Haff Poultry, Inc. v. Mountaire Farms, Inc. (D. Del. Sept. 30, 2025) (alleging poultry companies illegally fixed chicken boiler growers’ compensation like in In re Broiler Chicken Grower Antitrust Litig. (No. II) (E.D. Okla.))

• Commonwealth of Virginia v. Zillow Grp., Inc. (E.D. Va. Oct. 1, 2025) (alleging Zillow and Redfin entered into an anticompetitive agreement in the online rentals marketplace like in FTC v. Zillow Grp., Inc. (E.D. Va. Sept. 30, 2025))

Dispositive Orders and Verdicts

In re LIBOR-Based Fin. Instruments Antitrust Litig. (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 25, 2025):  In this case alleging that banks engaged in a conspiracy to suppress the London Interbank Offer Rate (“LIBOR”) in violation of Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act and state antitrust law, the court granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the remaining antitrust claims. The court found that (a) the Section 1 conspiracy claim failed because plaintiffs’ allegations of parallel LIBOR submissions did not plausibly suggest concerted action under Twombly, (b) plaintiffs failed to show antitrust injury because their claimed losses were derivative of suppressed LIBOR rates and did not constitute harm to competition, warranting dismissal of all federal and state antitrust claims.

Hansen v. Nw. Univ. (N.D. Ill. September 24, 2025): In this case alleging that the College Board and 40 universities conspired to require applicants for non-federal financial aid to submit noncustodial parent financial information in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, the court granted defendants’ motions to dismiss, including for lack of personal jurisdiction as to 15 non-Illinois universities. The court held that (a) venue and personal jurisdiction under Clayton Act § 12 were not satisfied because defendants’ limited recruitment and enrollment of Illinois students did not constitute “transacting business” of substantial character, (b) specific jurisdiction was lacking because plaintiffs’ own claims did not arise from the non-Illinois defendants’ Illinois contacts, and (c) the complaint failed to plausibly allege an anticompetitive agreement, as the staggered adoption of the noncustodial parent policy over nearly two decades, the limited trade association involvement, and conclusory assertions of “concerted action” did not amount to plus factors supporting an inference of conspiracy, requiring dismissal without prejudice.

Robinson v. NCAA (E.D. Mich. Sept. 26, 2025): In this case alleging that the NCAA, Big Ten Conference, and Big Ten Network unlawfully conspired to restrict compensation for student-athletes’ names, images, and likenesses in violation of, among others, the Sherman Act, the court granted defendants’ motions to dismiss, denied defendants’ motion to transfer venue or stay proceedings, and denied as moot plaintiffs’ motion for class certification. The court held that (a) the Chalmers case has already been dismissed, warranting denial of the motion to transfer venue as transfer would not promote judicial economy; (b) plaintiffs plausibly alleged injury-in-fact; (c) but the Sherman Act claims were time-barred under the four-year statute of limitations because the only overt acts occurred during their college years, and subsequent uses of NIL were merely continuing effects; and (d) equitable tolling did not apply because plaintiffs knew of the NCAA’s NIL rules and failed to plead fraudulent concealment with particularity.

In re Eyewear Antitrust Litig. (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 26, 2025): In this case alleging monopolization and attempted monopolization of the U.S. premium eyewear and custom lens markets in violation of, among other things,  Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act , the court granted defendants’ motion to dismiss. The court held that (a) both direct and indirect purchaser plaintiffs failed to allege a plausible relevant market because their definitions improperly combined non-interchangeable products, grouped prescription and non-prescription sunglasses despite acknowledging they serve different purposes, and excluded similarly priced competitors such as Warby Parker, (b) the direct purchasers’ custom lens claims failed because allegations of a 52% market share, without facts showing price control or exclusion of rivals, were insufficient to establish monopoly power under Second Circuit precedent holding even 64% inadequate, and (c) plaintiffs’ reliance on decades-old acquisitions, foreign conduct, and continuing-violation theories did not cure these deficiencies, particularly given the Second Circuit’s skepticism toward that doctrine.

Carefirst of Md., Inc. v. Amgen, Inc. (E.D. Va. Sept. 30, 2025): In this case alleging monopolization of the etanercept (Enbrel) market in violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act and parallel state laws, the court denied Amgen’s motion to dismiss the federal claim and most state-law antitrust claims, dismissing only Puerto Rico’s state antitrust claim. The court held that (a) CareFirst had antitrust standing as an indirect purchaser to seek injunctive relief under the Clayton Act, (b) while Amgen’s prosecution of patent applications and enforcement actions were protected by the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, its acquisition of Roche’s pending patent rights was not immunized and plausibly alleged as anticompetitive conduct under the Sherman Act, and (c) CareFirst sufficiently pleaded antitrust injury by alleging that the acquisition and subsequent injunctions delayed biosimilar entry and resulted in supracompetitive pricing.

Rawson Inc. v. Associated Materials, Inc. (D.N.M. Sept. 30, 2025): In this case alleging price discrimination in the sale of Alpine brand windows in Texas and New Mexico in violation of, among others, the Robinson-Patman Act, the court denied defendants’ motion to dismiss. The court found that plaintiff plausibly alleged Robinson-Patman Act claims by pleading contemporaneous sales of like-grade windows in New Mexico and discriminatory shipping terms in Texas that effectively raised its prices.

Townsend v. Advanced Energy Machs., LLC (D. Md. Sept. 17, 2025): In this case alleging a counterclaim for attempted monopolization of the nationwide zero-emission transport refrigeration unit (“TRU”) market in violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act, the court denied counter-defendants’ motion to dismiss the antitrust counterclaim. The court found that (a) AEM plausibly alleged anticompetitive conduct—including supplying defective batteries, misappropriating trade secrets, leveraging a promissory note, and interfering with distribution relationships—sufficient to infer specific intent to monopolize, and (b) AEM adequately defined the relevant market and alleged that displacement of its business would leave customers no alternative but defendants’ product, supporting a dangerous probability of success.

Robinson v. HP, Inc. (N.D. Ill. Sept. 30, 2025): In this case alleging that HP unlawfully tied its printers to HP-branded ink cartridges and engaged in exclusionary conduct in the aftermarket for replacement ink cartridges in violation of, among others, the Sherman Act, the court granted HP’s motion to dismiss without prejudice. The court held that (a) plaintiffs failed to plausibly allege a Section 1 tying arrangement because they did not show HP conditioned printer sales or ongoing support services on an agreement to purchase HP ink, with the firmware update occurring years after printer purchases, (b) plaintiffs’ Section 2 “refusal to deal” theory failed because HP had no prior voluntary, profitable course of dealing with competitors as required under Aspen Skiing and Trinko, and (c) plaintiffs’ unilateral redesign theory failed because they did not plausibly allege that HP possessed monopoly power or sufficient market share in the aftermarket for HP-compatible ink cartridges to create or threaten a monopoly.

Whaleco Inc. v. Shein Tech. LLC (D.D.C. Sept. 30, 2025): In this case alleging monopolization, attempted monopolization, and exclusive dealing in the U.S. ultra-fast fashion market in violation of, among others, the Sherman Act, Clayton Act §3, and D.C. antitrust law, the court granted Shein’s motion to dismiss all antitrust claims. The court found that (a) it did not have subject matter jurisdiction over the Sherman Act and D.C. antitrust claims under the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act because Shein’s alleged exclusionary conduct toward Chinese suppliers occurred abroad, did not involve “import commerce,” and any domestic effects (higher U.S. prices) did not “give rise to” Temu’s injury, (b) the Clayton Act §3 claim failed because Shein was a buyer, not a seller, in the exclusive-dealing contracts at issue, and (c) the parallel D.C. antitrust claims were limited by the same FTAIA restrictions, requiring dismissal.

Pac-12 Conf. v. Mountain West Conf. (N.D. Cal. Sept. 30, 2025): In this case alleging that the Mountain West Conference’s (“MWC”) termination-fee provisions in a football scheduling agreement with the Pac-12 Conference unlawfully restrained competition in violation of, among others, Section 1 of the Sherman Act and California’s Cartwright Act, the court denied MWC’s motion to dismiss. The court found that (a) the Pac-12 adequately alleged antitrust standing by pleading that the termination fees depleted its resources and limited competition for member schools, (b) the complaint plausibly alleged a per se unlawful horizontal market allocation, while the question of whether the provision qualifies as an ancillary restraint subject to rule of reason analysis could not be resolved at the pleading stage, and (c) the Cartwright Act claim was sustained for the same reasons as the Sherman Act claim.

Class Actions Certifications and Settlements

In re Generic Pharms. Pricing Antitrust Litig. (E.D. Pa. Sept. 26, 2025): In this case alleging horizontal price-fixing of the generic drug clomipramine in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act and various state antitrust and consumer-protection statutes, the court granted final approval of an End-Payer Class settlement with Sandoz Inc. and Fougera Pharmaceuticals for between $230 million and $275 million and certified a settlement class of consumers and third-party payors of certain drugs across most states (excluding Indiana and Ohio). The settlement provides for pro rata distribution, service awards of $410,000, attorneys’ fees of one-third of the net fund, and $25.7 million in expenses, with the court finding the relief fair and adequate despite objections from several state attorneys general acting as amici, whose objections were heard but not adopted.

Nosalek v. MLS Prop. Info. Network, Inc. (D. Mass. June 10, 2025): In this class action in which home sellers alleged that defendants conspired to impose inflated buyer-broker commissions through the multiple listing service (“MLS”) Pinergy, the court granted final approval of a settlement between plaintiffs and MLS Property Information Network, Inc. The settlement resolves claims on behalf of home sellers who paid buyer-broker commissions in connection with MLS PIN-listed transactions between December 17, 2016 and September 29, 2025. The court certified the settlement class, approved notice procedures, and dismissed the action with prejudice as to MLS PIN, while retaining jurisdiction to enforce the settlement’s terms.

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If you have any antirust questions or would like more information about any of these matters, please contact one of the following authors:

Christian Lorenz Zach Martin  christian@kressinpowers.com zach@kressinpowers.com

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