Last Week in Antitrust Litigation (#022)

Week of August 11, 2025

Top Takeaways

1. Higher Ed Coordination Case Tests Sherman Act §1: Plaintiffs allege horizontal agreement among elite universities and shared platforms to enforce nonbinding Early Decision commitments, potentially redefining competitive constraints in admissions.

2. Noncompete Enforcement as Monopolization Theory: CRNA market suit in Texas frames restrictive covenants as exclusionary conduct under Sherman Act §§1–2, underscoring litigation risk for healthcare providers using broad restraints.

3. RAND Obligations and Patent-Privateering in Focus: Disney’s claims against InterDigital highlight evolving antitrust theories on standard-essential patent licensing, portfolio tying, and evasion of FRAND commitments through strategic transfers.

New Cases Filed

D'Amico v. Consortium on Fin. Higher Educ. (D. Mass. Aug. 8, 2025): Plaintiffs filed a putative class action against the Consortium on Financing Higher Education, two college application platforms (the Common Application and Scoir/Coalition App), and numerous elite private colleges and universities alleging a horizontal agreement to restrict competition for students admitted through Early Decision and to enforce that agreement through information sharing and mutual refusals to recruit such students, in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act. Plaintiffs allege defendants coordinated through shared application platforms, shared Early Decision admit lists, and portrayed Early Decision commitments as binding despite their lack of legal enforceability, thereby deterring students from seeking or considering competing offers. According to the complaint, this conduct reduced price competition for a substantial portion of incoming classes, enabling higher tuition and less generous need- and merit-based aid, particularly disadvantaging lower-income applicants and distorting competitive student–school matching. Plaintiffs seek class certification, treble damages and/or restitution, declaratory relief, and a permanent injunction barring coordination on Early Decision policies, along with attorneys’ fees, costs, and other appropriate equitable relief.

EmergencHealth, PLLC v. Anesthesia Assocs., PA (E.D. Tex. Aug. 10, 2025): Plaintiffs filed a complaint alleging that Anesthesia Associates, PA, and Anesthesia Associates Group, PLLC used noncompete agreements to unlawfully monopolize the market for CRNA services in Jefferson County in violation of Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act. Plaintiffs allege that after Anesthesia Associates terminated its contract to provide anesthesia services at CHRISTUS Southeast Texas – St. Elizabeth Hospital, it sought to block CRNAs from working there for EmergencHealth by enforcing noncompetes against all or nearly all CRNAs in the county and demanding $400,000 per CRNA to waive the restrictions, thereby foreclosing alternative CRNA supply. Plaintiffs contend that this conduct, among other things, eliminates competing CRNA providers. Plaintiffs seek declaratory relief that the noncompetes cannot be enforced against any current or former CRNA in Jefferson County or at any facility where Anesthesia Associates no longer provides anesthesia services, injunctive relief prohibiting enforcement of the noncompetes, treble damages, and attorneys’ fees and costs.

Disney Enters., Inc. v. Interdigitial, Inc. (D. Del. Aug. 8, 2025): Disney filed a complaint against InterDigital, Inc., multiple InterDigital subsidiaries, Thomson Licensing SAS, and Technicolor SA alleging abusive patent-licensing practices and monopolization in the markets for video compression and streaming technology in violation of Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act. The complaint contends defendants engaged in (a) false reasonable and non-discriminatory (“RAND”) promises to a standard-setting organization to secure inclusion of their technologies in H.264 and H.265 video standards, (b) a patent-privateering agreement transferring Thomson’s standard-essential patents to InterDigital to evade RAND obligations and extract supra-RAND royalties, (c) coercive portfolio licensing that tied standard-essential and non-essential patents, and (d) exclusionary litigation tactics and secrecy provisions to maintain monopoly power and discriminate against licensees. Disney alleges this conduct foreclosed alternative technologies, locked in implementers, enabled “double-dipping” against already-licensed devices, and threatened exclusion from major streaming markets, thereby raising prices. Disney seeks treble damages, declaratory and injunctive relief including declarations of unenforceability of certain patents and that RAND commitments apply to encoding patents, and attorneys’ fees and costs.

Brill Mar., Inc. v. Boats Grp., LLC (S.D. Fl. Aug. 14, 2025): Brill Maritime filed a putative class action against Boats Group alleging unlawful monopolization and attempted monopolization of the U.S. boat listing and marketing services market in violation of, among others, the Sherman Act and the Florida Antitrust Act. According to the complaint, Boats Group—owner of Boat Trader, YachtWorld, and boats.com—engaged in exclusionary conduct including serial acquisitions of competitors dating back to 2004, steep and sustained subscription price increases exceeding 400% over the past decade, restrictive subscription terms, and exclusive dealing provisions that foreclose rivals from inventory and scale. Plaintiffs allege this conduct has allowed Boats Group to maintain dominant market power, suppress competition, deter new entry, and impose supracompetitive fees on brokers and dealers, resulting in higher costs for sellers and reduced choice and higher prices for consumers. The suit seeks class certification for nationwide and Florida classes, treble damages, permanent injunctive relief to restore competition, declaratory relief, attorneys’ fees, and costs.

Follow-on cases that were filed include:

• Ascension Health v. MultiPlan, Inc. (N.D. Ill. Aug. 8, 2025) (alleging price-fixing conspiracy amount health insurers and third-party administrators like in In re Multiplan Health Ins. Provider Litig. (N.D. Ill.))

• Journey Hillside Tarzana, LLC v. Multiplan, Inc. (N.D. Ill. Aug. 12, 2025) (same)

• Wash. State Med. Ass'n v. Multiplan, Inc. (N.D. Ill. Aug. 12, 2025) (same)

• Ohio State Med. Ass'n v. Multiplan, Inc. (N.D. Ill. Aug. 12, 2025) (same)

• Mo. State Med. Ass'n v. Multiplan, Inc. (N.D. Ill. Aug. 12, 2025) (same)

• Mich. State Med. Ass'n v. Multiplan, Inc. (N.D. Ill. Aug. 12, 2025) (same)

• Cal. Med. Ass'n v. Multiplan, Inc. (N.D. Ill. Aug. 12, 2025) (same)

• Tenn. Interventional & Imaging Assocs. v. MultiPlan, Inc. (N.D. Ill. Aug. 12, 2025) (same)

• Adventist HealthCare, Inc. v. Multiplan, Inc. (N.D. Ill. Aug. 12, 2025) (same)

Dispositive Orders and Verdicts

Bellamy v. NCAA (M.D. Tenn. Aug. 7, 2025): In this case alleging that NCAA eligibility rules unlawfully restrict the labor market for Division I football players in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, the court denied plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction. The court held that, even assuming plaintiffs could show a likelihood of success on the merits, (a) they failed to demonstrate irreparable harm because delays in seeking relief, lack of immediate roster commitments for some plaintiffs, and differences from prior cases like Pavia undermined urgency; (b) the balance of equities weighed against relief due to plaintiffs’ delay and the NCAA’s interest in stability of eligibility rules; and (c) the public interest factor did not strongly favor relief as the injunction would affect only these plaintiffs, and one plaintiff was independently ineligible under a separate agent-related bylaw.

In re Copaxone Antitrust Litig. (D.N.J. Aug. 7, 2025): In this case alleging monopolization of the glatiramer acetate (“GA”) market for multiple sclerosis treatments through exclusionary agreements and other anticompetitive conduct in violation of, among others, Section 2 of the Sherman Act and various state antitrust, the Special Master recommended granting in part and denying in part Teva’s motion to dismiss the Third-Party Payors’ complaint. As to the antitrust claims, the Special Master found that: (a) standing issues for out-of-state claims should be addressed at class certification; (b) the Sherman Act § 2 claim for injunctive relief could proceed in full; (c) antitrust claims could proceed for the District of Columbia, Wisconsin, and Kansas — but only as to exclusionary agreement allegations for Kansas — while other state antitrust claims were dismissed (some with prejudice and some without); (d) Copay Assistance allegations were dismissed as pled, with leave to amend limited to the period after generic GA entered the market; (e) fraudulent concealment tolling was not adequately pled and was dismissed with prejudice; (f) the applicability of the continuing violation doctrine would be addressed in later briefing; and (g) “background” allegations regarding the 40mg shift and petitioning activity were dismissed and ordered removed from any amended complaint.

Dean v. Roku, Inc. (M.D. Fl. Aug. 8, 2025): In this case alleging monopolization and exclusive dealing in the markets for (a) applications that interact with Roku devices and (b) streaming platform operating systems in violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act and Section 3 of the Clayton Act, the court granted Roku’s motion to dismiss the Second Amended Complaint with prejudice. Roku sought dismissal on the grounds that: (a) the complaint was an impermissible shotgun pleading, (b) Plaintiff lacked Article III and antitrust standing and failed to allege proper relevant markets, and (c) the allegations did not plausibly show monopoly power, harm to competition, or substantial foreclosure. The court found that (a) the complaint met minimal pleading standards and was not a shotgun pleading, (b) Plaintiff, suing individually rather than through his company Veamcast, failed to allege antitrust injury to competition or that he was an efficient enforcer, as any harm alleged was personal and indirect, (c) Roku’s alleged 48.3% market share was insufficient as a matter of law to establish monopoly power, the markets were ill-defined, no exclusive contracts or substantial foreclosure were alleged, and (d) given Plaintiff’s prior unsuccessful attempts, further amendment would be futile, warranting dismissal with prejudice.

Alvarado v. Western Range Ass’n (D. Nev. Aug. 8, 2025): In this case alleging horizontal wage-fixing and market allocation agreements among Western Range Association (“WRA”) and its member ranches for employing domestic and foreign sheepherders in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, the court denied all defendants’ motions to dismiss. Defendants sought dismissal on the grounds that: (a) they were immune from antitrust liability under new theories including the Copperweld single-entity doctrine, Section 6 of the Clayton Act/Capper-Volstead Act, joint-employer or agency principles, and implied immunity from the H-2A regulatory scheme; (b) the complaint failed to plead a per se violation and instead required rule-of-reason analysis, and lacked adequate market definition allegations; (c) plaintiff had not adequately alleged antitrust injury or damages; and (d) the TAC still failed to plead facts showing each ranch defendant’s knowing assent to and participation in the alleged conspiracies. The court held that (a) none of the asserted immunity doctrines applied: WRA’s members are independent competitors under Copperweld/American Needle; Section 6/Capper-Volstead immunity does not extend to labor-market restraints; joint-employer or agency status does not eliminate capacity to conspire under Section 1; and H-2A regulations do not clearly conflict with the Sherman Act; (b) plaintiff plausibly alleged horizontal wage-fixing and market-allocation agreements subject to per se condemnation, and in the alternative under quick-look or full rule-of-reason analysis, with the alleged “U.S. sheepherder labor market” sufficiently defined; (c) plaintiff sufficiently pled antitrust injury and damages based on alleged market-wide wage suppression; and (d) the TAC added particularized facts—such as membership agreements and by-laws ceding wage-setting and hiring authority to WRA, documented no-transfer/no-solicitation rules and enforcement, and patterns of uniform wage-setting—that went beyond mere association membership and plausibly showed each ranch defendant’s assent to and participation in both alleged conspiracies.

RecoveryX Livingston LLC v. City of Livingston (E.D. Tex. Aug. 11, 2025): In this case alleging monopolization of the retail electricity market in Livingston, Texas in violation of, among other things, the Sherman Act and Texas Free Enterprise and Antitrust Act, the court granted in part and denied in part defendants’ motions to dismiss the antitrust claims. The court held that (a) Texas does not recognize champerty, so contractual assignments from individuals and entities conferred standing to plaintiff, (b) the state-action doctrine barred claims against the City because its alleged conduct—charging allegedly excessive rates and forgoing ad valorem taxes—was undertaken pursuant to PURA’s clearly articulated policy to displace competition and did not plausibly allege foreclosure of competition, and (c) the indirect purchaser rule barred claims against SRMPA and the Fifth Circuit has not adopted, and the court declined to apply, the co-conspirator exception even when all alleged conspirators were named.

Rumble, Inc. v. World Federation of Advertisers (N.D. Tex. Aug. 13, 2025): In this case alleging a group boycott and other concerted refusals to deal in the digital advertising market for user-generated video platforms in violation of Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, the court granted defendants’ motion to dismiss without prejudice. The court found that (a) it lacked general and specific jurisdiction because none of the defendants were subject to general jurisdiction in Texas, plaintiffs’ alleged injuries did not arise from any defendant’s Texas contacts, Section 12 of the Clayton Act did not confer nationwide jurisdiction absent proper venue, and Rule 4(k)(2) was inapplicable because GroupM, Diageo, and WPP conceded jurisdiction in the Southern District of New York and plaintiffs failed to show WFA had sufficient U.S. contacts; (b) venue was improper under Section 12 because no defendant transacted substantial business in the Northern District of Texas and under § 1391 because personal jurisdiction was lacking; and (c) related litigation in the district challenging the same alleged conspiracy could not cure these defects, the court denied plaintiffs’ request for jurisdictional discovery, and dismissed without reaching the merits. (Disclaimer: Kressin Powers LLP represents Rumble in this matter.)

Connecticut v. Sandoz, Inc. (D. Conn. Aug. 13, 2025): In this case alleging an overarching conspiracy among manufacturers of dermatology generic drugs in violation of antitrust laws, the court denied defendants’ motion for summary judgment. The Court rejected defendants’ sole argument that the complaint was duplicative of claims in two related generic drug antitrust actions because: (a) the plaintiff states made representations limiting the conspiracy to dermatology drugs and named defendants distinguished the case from the others; (b) any industry-wide allegations did not alter that legal theory and could be addressed through preclusion doctrines or motions in limine if overlap later arose, and (c) Judge Rufe’s prior MDL order permitted continued pre-litigation subpoenas to non-MDL parties and the states’ narrowed theory defeated the abuse argument, warranting denial of summary judgment.

Class Action Certifications and Settlements

In re Papa John's Emp. & Franchisee Emp. Antitrust Litig. (W.D. Ky. Aug. 7, 2025): In this putative antitrust class action in which current and former employees allege that Papa John’s franchise-wide “no-poach” provisions unlawfully suppressed wages in violation of the Sherman Act, the court preliminarily approved a settlement with Papa John’s International and Papa John’s USA. The court provisionally certified a settlement class of approximately 401,000 individuals employed at U.S. Papa John’s-branded restaurants between December 18, 2014 and December 31, 2021, who earned more than $200 during that period. The order approved notice procedures (primarily by email, with postcard backup), appointed A.B. Data as claims administrator, and set a January 7, 2026 final approval hearing, with claims, objections, and opt-outs due by November 15, 2025.

Connecticut v. Aurobindo Pharma USA, Inc. (D. Conn. Aug. 12, 2025): In this case alleging price fixing and market allocation in the sale of several generic drugs in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act and state antitrust laws, the court granted final approval of the plaintiff States’ $39.1 million settlement with Apotex Corp. The court approved allocation of 70% of the funds to restitution for consumers and state entities and 30% to notice, administration, and litigation costs, specifically designating approximately $17.62 million (45.08%) to consumers, $9.75 million (24.92%) to state entities, and $11.73 million to cover settlement administration and litigation costs, including attorneys’ fees. No timely objections were filed, the court found the notice plan satisfied due process and was the best practicable under the circumstances, and a final distribution plan will be submitted once additional settlements are included.

In re Pork Antitrust Litig. (D. Minn. Aug. 13, 2025): In this class action alleging price-fixing in the pork industry, the court granted final approval of direct purchaser plaintiff settlements with Tyson ($50 million), Clemens ($10 million), and Triumph ($4 million). The certified class includes all persons and entities that directly purchased specified fresh or frozen pork products in the U.S. from June 29, 2014 through June 30, 2018. The court found the settlements fair, reasonable, and adequate under Rule 23, noting no objections from class members, and dismissed claims against the settling defendants with prejudice while retaining jurisdiction over settlement administration.

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If you have any antirust questions or would like more information about any of these matters, please contact one of the following authors:

Christian Lorenz Zach Martin  christian@kressinpowers.com zach@kressinpowers.com

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