Last Week in Antitrust Litigation (#021)

Week of August 4, 2025

Top Takeaways

1. Coordinated Pricing in Platform Markets: Parallel class actions against AAMC and LSAC illustrate the legal vulnerability of membership-driven platforms where uniform fee structures and exclusionary practices can be framed as horizontal agreements.

2. Merger Control in Two-Firm Innovation Markets: The FTC’s TAVR-AR device challenge emphasizes the agency’s focus on “innovation markets” and nascent competition theories, particularly where pipeline products are the only alternatives.

3. Judicial Signals on Antitrust Pleading Standards: Recent decisions in Texas v. BlackRock, Rising Pharma, and Innovative Health show courts interpreting antitrust injury and plus-factor allegations broadly enough to survive dismissal, even against sophisticated defenses like passive investor safe harbors.

New Cases Filed

Dadbod Apparel LLC v. Hildawn Design LLC (N.D. Ohio Aug. 1, 2025): Dadbod Apparel filed a complaint alleging Hildawn Design LLC and its principal Hilary D. Wertin engaged in a fraudulent trademark enforcement campaign to monopolize the market for apparel featuring the words “girl” and “dad,” in violation of, among other things, Section 2 of the Sherman Act. The complaint asserts that defendants fraudulently obtained and renewed the GIRLDAD trademark registration, then misused it by issuing over 75 takedown notices across Amazon, Etsy, and TikTok to remove Plaintiff’s non-infringing products bearing the decorative slogan “Support Your Local Girl Dad.” Plaintiffs claim this conduct sought to suppress competition in the expressive apparel niche by excluding rivals through false infringement claims and economic coercion, particularly during the critical holiday season. Plaintiff seeks cancellation of the GIRLDAD mark, a declaratory judgment of non-infringement, over $1 million in damages (and trebling), and attorneys’ fees and costs.

Durbal v. Ass'n of Am. Med. Colls. (D.D.C. Aug. 4, 2025): Plaintiff filed a putative class action against the Association of American Medical Colleges (“AAMC”) alleging that AAMC conspired with its member medical schools to fix Primary Application fees and monopolize the market for medical school application platforms, in violation of, among other things, the Sherman Act. The complaint asserts that AAMC, controlled by its member schools, set uniform and annually increasing application fees that applicants were required to pay regardless of the school applied to, while simultaneously providing its platform to member schools for free and excluding competing platforms. Plaintiff contends this conduct suppressed price and quality competition, foreclosed alternative platforms, and allowed AAMC to extract supracompetitive fees from applicants, causing direct economic harm to hundreds of thousands of medical school applicants. Plaintiff seeks certification of a nationwide class, treble damages, injunctive relief, and attorneys’ fees and costs.

Risner v. Law Sch. Admission Council, Inc. (E.D. Pa. Aug. 4, 2025): Plaintiff filed a putative class action alleging that the Law School Admission Council, Inc. (“LSAC”) and its 197 Member Law Schools fixed the prices of mandatory application platform fees in violation of the Sherman Act. Plaintiff contends that LSAC, controlled by the law schools it serves, imposes uniform and inflated fees—$215 upfront plus $45 per application—for its centralized Credential Assembly Service, while excluding competitors and providing free services and kickbacks to schools to maintain platform dominance. Plaintiff alleges this conduct eliminates price competition among law schools, inflates application costs for students, and forecloses market entry by alternative vendors. Plaintiff seeks nationwide class certification, treble damages, attorneys’ fees and costs, and a permanent injunction against LSAC’s pricing and exclusionary practices.

FTC v. Edwards Lifesciences Corp. (D.D.C. Aug. 6, 2025): The Federal Trade Commission filed a complaint against Edwards Lifesciences Corporation and JenaValve Technology, Inc., alleging that Edwards’ proposed acquisition of JenaValve would substantially lessen competition in the U.S. market for transcatheter aortic valve replacement devices for the treatment of aortic regurgitation (“TAVR-AR devices”) in violation of the Clayton Act and the FTC Act. According to the FTC, Edwards—through its subsidiary JC Medical—and JenaValve are the only two companies conducting FDA clinical trials for TAVR-AR devices, and the merger would eliminate head-to-head competition, risk deprioritizing or abandoning one device, slow innovation, and potentially raise prices. The FTC seeks a preliminary injunction to block the acquisition pending its administrative proceeding, an order maintaining the status quo, and any other appropriate equitable relief.

Follow-on cases that were filed include:

• Goldberger v. Fanatics, Inc. (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 1, 2025) (alleging conspiracy resulting in inflated prices for sports trading cards like in Scaturo v. Fanatics, Inc. (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 17, 2025))

• Robinson v. NCAA (N.D.W. Va. Aug. 1, 2025) (alleging NCAA’s eligibility rules are anticompetitive like in Elad v. NCAA (D.N.J. Mar. 20, 2025))

• Allina Health Sys. v. Blue Cross Blue Shield Ass'n (N.D. Cal. Aug. 4, 2025) (alleging market allocation and price-fixing in health insurance industry like in CommonSpirit v. Blue Cross (N.D. Ill. Mar. 4, 2025))

• OpenX Techs., Inc. v. Google LLC (E.D. Va. Aug. 4, 2025) (alleging Google monopolized the ad server and ad exchange markets like in United States v. Google LLC (E.D. Va. Jan. 24, 2023))

• Methodist Hosp. v. Claritev Corp. (N.D. Ill. Aug. 6, 2025) (alleging price-fixing conspiracy amount health insurers and third-party administrators like in In re Multiplan Health Ins. Provider Litig. (N.D. Ill.))

• Cont. Mfg. Servs., Inc. v. RB Glob., Inc. (D. Conn. Aug. 7, 2025) (alleging conspiracy to artificially increase construction equipment rental prices nationwide like in AXG Roofing, LLC v. RB Glob., Inc. (N.D. Ill. Apr. 1, 2025))

Dispositive Orders and Verdicts

Innovative Health LLC v. Biosense Webster, Inc. (C.D. Cal. July 31, 2025): In this case alleging unlawful tying and monopolization in the markets for the sale of high-density mapping catheters and ultrasound catheters in violation of Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act and California’s Cartwright Act, the court granted plaintiff’s motion for a permanent injunction with modifications. The court held that: (a) Biosense’s clinical support policy caused irreparable harm and unlawfully tied services to product purchases, justifying a non-discrimination provision that also applied to access to CARTO; (b) an injunction on future blocking technology was necessary to prevent recurrence, provided it targeted only intentionally exclusionary designs and excluded pre-June 2025 technology; (c) although the jury did not find catheter collection practices unlawful, the court found them sufficiently connected to anticompetitive conduct to justify an injunction; (d) biannual compliance reports were minimally burdensome and justified to ensure enforcement; (e) a third-party hotline created and funded by Innovative was appropriate given trust concerns with J&J’s internal hotline; and (f) a five-year term, rather than ten, balanced market dynamics with the duration of industry supply contracts, and preserved court flexibility to adjust the injunction.

Texas v. Blackrock, Inc. (E.D. Tex. Aug. 1, 2025): In this case alleging that BlackRock, State Street, and Vanguard conspired to depress coal production through coordinated shareholder activism in violation of, among other things, Section 1 of the Sherman Act, Section 7 of the Clayton Act, and various state antitrust laws the court denied in large part defendants’ motions to dismiss. Defendants sought dismissal on the grounds that: (a) the Clayton Act claim failed because defendants were passive investors entitled to statutory safe harbor, (b) the Sherman Act claim failed because plaintiffs did not plausibly allege an agreement or harm to competition, and (c) the state antitrust claims failed for the same reasons. The court found that: (a) plaintiffs plausibly alleged that defendants used their stockholdings to influence coal companies to reduce output, thereby defeating the passive investor defense under Section 7, (b) plaintiffs alleged sufficient parallel conduct and plus factors to support a plausible inference of agreement, (c) plaintiffs plausibly alleged reduced output and increased prices as direct evidence of antitrust injury to survive under the rule of reason, and (c) the state antitrust claims survived because they track federal law.

Rising Pharma Holdings, Inc. v. Cosette Pharms., Inc. (D.N.J. Aug. 5, 2025): In this case alleging an unlawful exclusive dealing arrangement in the market for clomiphene citrate in violation of, among other things, the Sherman Act, the court denied defendants’ motion to dismiss. The court held that (a) the alleged exclusive supply agreement between Cosette and FIS plausibly harmed competition and delayed generic entry, satisfying the antitrust injury requirement, (b) the complaint plausibly alleged a direct causal link between the exclusive agreement and Rising Pharma’s inability to launch its product after FIS reversed its prior commitment to supply API, and (c) plaintiffs sufficiently pled preparedness to compete based on ANDA filings, regulatory progress, and procurement steps.

Cinemacloudwords, Inc. v. Comscore, Inc. (C.D. Cal. Aug. 5, 2025): In this case alleging monopolization and unlawful tying in the market for theatrical box office data in violation of, among other things, the Sherman and Clayton Acts, the court denied plaintiff CinemaCloudWorks’ ex parte application for a temporary restraining order compelling defendant Comscore to restore access to its Box Office Essentials data service. The court held that: (a) plaintiff failed to demonstrate true exigency or irreparable prejudice as required for ex parte relief because it delayed filing despite knowing the August 15 release date since April, and (b) the last-minute Friday filing constituted improper “line-cutting” under Mission Power, justifying denial without reaching the merits and prompting the court to order plaintiff’s counsel to review governing standards for ex parte practice.

Megatel Homes, LLC v. City of Mansfield, Tex. (N.D. Tex. Aug. 6, 2025): In this case alleging that the City of Mansfield unlawfully monopolized and restrained trade in the retail water utility market in its extraterritorial jurisdiction in violation of, among other things, Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, the magistrate judge recommended granting in part and denying in part the City’s motion to dismiss. The City sought dismissal on the grounds that: (a) under Rule 12(b)(1), plaintiffs lacked Article III standing and their claims were not ripe; and (b) under Rule 12(b)(6), the Sherman Act claims were barred by the state-action immunity doctrine and were incompatible with what it characterized as a contract dispute. The court held that (a) plaintiffs had standing and ripe claims based on ongoing harm and purely legal issues, and (b) Texas’s Water Code expressly contemplates retail water utility monopolies as a substitute for competition, making the City’s alleged conduct a foreseeable result of delegated authority; finding this regulatory scheme sufficient to displace competition, the court rejected plaintiffs’ contrary arguments, noted alternative remedies under the Water Code, recommending dismissal of the Sherman Act claims.

Bryan v. Ascend Learning, LLC (D. Mass. Aug. 6, 2025): In this case alleging monopolization of the “Nursing Exam Marketplace” in violation of, among other things, Section 2 of the Sherman Act, the court granted defendants’ motion to dismiss with prejudice. The court held that (a) plaintiffs’ market definition—lifted from defendants’ own description of their products—was impermissibly circular, overly broad, and failed to apply the principles of reasonable interchangeability and cross-elasticity of demand, precluding allegations of monopoly power, and (b) it was also skeptical that plaintiffs sufficiently pleaded anticompetitive conduct, citing examples such as sole-source contracts with public schools and the related lawsuit as generally not anticompetitive as a matter of law.

Larry v. NCAA (D. Colo. Aug. 6, 2025): In this case alleging that the NCAA’s eligibility rules unlawfully restrain trade in the market for “elite college football” in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act and Colorado law, the magistrate judge recommended denying plaintiff’s motions for preliminary injunction. Plaintiff sought to enjoin enforcement of the “Five Year Rule” for the 2025–2026 season. The court found that (a) although appellate and district courts have reached differing conclusions on the noncommercial-eligibility argument, it need not resolve that issue and assumed Sherman Act applicability, (b) plaintiff failed to identify a relevant market, and (b) plaintiff’s reliance on his own exclusion from play was insufficient to show anticompetitive effects harming consumers, as antitrust laws protect competition, not individual competitors; the court further rejected new “spirit of the rules” arguments raised for the first time in reply as waived and legally unsupported, and accordingly recommended denial of injunctive relief.

Frye v. Ass'n of State & Provincial Psych. Bds. (E.D. Cal. Aug. 1, 2025): In this pro se case alleging monopolization and attempted monopolization of the psychology licensing examination market in violation of, among other things, Section 2 of the Sherman Act, the magistrate judge recommended dismissal of the antitrust claims with leave to amend as to the antitrust claims. The court found that (a) there were no facts alleged as to defendant Pearson, warranting dismissal, (b) the monopolization claim consisted of conclusory allegations that ASPPB required states to use its exam, without facts showing it controlled state licensing regimes or engaged in anticompetitive conduct, and (c) the attempted monopolization claim relied only on ASPPB’s publication of a position paper about Applied Behavior Analysis licensing, which did not constitute anticompetitive conduct or show specific intent.

Class Action Certifications and Settlements

Othart Dairy Farms, LLC v. Dairy Farmers of Am. (D.N.M. July 31, 2025): In this class action involving claims by dairy farmers against Dairy Farmers of America, Inc. (“DFA”) and Select Milk Producers, Inc. for alleged market abuses in the Southwest milk market, the court granted preliminary approval of settlements with both defendants. The court certified a settlement class of all dairy farmers who produced and sold Grade A milk to DFA or Select in DFA’s Southwest Area region (covering New Mexico, most of Texas, eastern Arizona, the Oklahoma panhandle, and southwestern Kansas) from January 1, 2015 to June 30, 2025. The court approved the notice and claims process, appointed A.B. Data, Ltd. as settlement administrator, appointed Huntington Bank as escrow agent, approved the creation of qualified settlement funds, and set a schedule culminating in a fairness hearing to consider final approval, fees, and service awards. The litigation is stayed pending final settlement approval.

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If you have any antirust questions or would like more information about any of these matters, please contact one of the following authors:

Christian Lorenz Zach Martin  christian@kressinpowers.com zach@kressinpowers.com

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