Last Week in Antitrust Litigation (#016)

Week of June 30, 2025

Top Takeaways

1. AI litigation surge: OpenAI and Microsoft face explosive class action claims alleging a conspiracy to suppress licensing markets for LLM training data—expect more tech-platform antitrust suits targeting data acquisition practices.

2. Apple can’t dodge monopoly claims: The court refused to dismiss DOJ’s monopolization case, finding Apple’s developer restrictions and market power plausible enough to proceed—signaling renewed enforcement appetite.

3. Litigation funders get greenlight: In a major win for claim assignment strategies, a court upheld standing for a Burford-backed entity prosecuting antitrust claims, rejecting public policy objections.

New Cases Filed

Denial v. OpenAI, Inc. (N.D. Cal. June 30, 2025): Plaintiffs filed a putative class action against OpenAI and Microsoft alleging the companies conspired to restrain trade in the market for training data used to develop large language models (“LLMs”), in violation of, among others, the Sherman Act. Plaintiffs allege that OpenAI and Microsoft obtained vast quantities of copyrighted material—including by scraping websites in violation of terms of service, torrenting pirated content from shadow libraries, and exchanging unlawfully obtained datasets with each other—while deliberately suppressing a competitive licensing market. According to the complaint, this conduct artificially restrained prices, foreclosed market participation by authors and publishers, and reduced incentives to invest in new data creation. Plaintiffs seek class certification, treble damages, restitution, disgorgement, injunctive relief requiring destruction of improperly obtained data and a prohibition on using it in model development, and attorneys’ fees and costs.

Follow-on cases that were filed include:

• M.M. v. Shenzhen Smoore Tech. Co. (D. Nev. June 27, 2025) (alleging conspiracy to fix prices and not compete in the wholesale distribution of cannabis oil vaporizer systems and components like in Earth’s Healing, Inc. v. Shenzhen Smoore Tech. Co. (N.D. Cal. Feb. 11, 2025))

• H.H. v. Shenzhen Smoore Tech. Co. (D. Ariz. June 28, 2025) (same)

• B.Z. v. Shenzhen Smoore Tech. Co. (N.D. Ill. July 2, 2025) (same)

• Cwynar v. Real Brokerage, Inc. (N.D. Ill. June 28, 2025) (alleging conspiracy to fix and raise prices of real estate commissions like in QJ Team, LLC v. Tex. Ass’n of Realtors, Inc. (E.D. Tex. Nov. 13, 2023))

• Proton AG v. Apple Inc. (N.D. Cal. June 30, 2025) (alleging Apple monopolized the iOS app distribution and payment processing markets like in Korean Publishers Ass'n v. Apple, Inc. (N.D. Cal. May 23, 2025))

• Boyd v. NCAA (M.D. Tenn. June 30, 2025) (alleging NCAA’s eligibility rules are anticompetitive like in Elad v. NCAA (D.N.J. Mar. 20, 2025))

• PLS.com, LLC v. Nat'l Ass'n of Realtors (C.D. Cal. July 1, 2025) (alleging conspiracy to fix and raise prices of real estate commissions like in QJ Team, LLC v. Tex. Ass’n of Realtors, Inc. (E.D. Tex. Nov. 13, 2023))

• PLS.com, LLC v. Nat'l Ass'n of Realtors (N.D. Cal. July 1, 2025) (same)

• Haff Poultry, Inc. v. Mountaire Farms, Inc. (E.D. Okla. July 1, 2025) (alleging chicken processors conspired to limit efforts to recruit growers to fix compensation below competitive levels like in Avila v. Perdue Farms, Inc. (D. Md. Oct. 16, 2019))

Dispositive Orders and Verdicts

Mont. Mun. Interlocal Auth v. Mont. State Fund (D. Mont. June 27, 2025): In this case alleging discriminatory pricing and monopolization in Montana’s workers’ compensation insurance market in violation of, among others, the Sherman Act and Robinson-Patman Act, the court granted defendants’ motion to dismiss. Defendants sought dismissal on the ground that. The court found that (a) Montana’s comprehensive regulatory scheme governing rates and marketing activities satisfied the McCarran-Ferguson Act’s exemption for “the business of insurance,” precluding application of federal antitrust laws, and (b) having dismissed the federal claims, it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to address the state-law claims.

In re Rail Freight Fuel Surcharge Antitrust Litig. (D.D.C. June 27, 2025): In this case alleging a conspiracy among the four largest U.S. freight railroads to impose coordinated fuel surcharges (“FSCs”) in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, the court granted defendants’ joint and individual motions for summary judgment. The court held that: (a) plaintiffs did not have direct proof of the alleged conspiracy, (b) defendants’ FSC formulas and coverage practices diverged materially and did not exhibit parallel conduct; (b) even if considered parallel, the record showed defendants acted independently in pursuit of rational self-interest in response to fuel price volatility, and plaintiffs’ “plus factors” failed to support a reasonable inference of conspiracy; and (c) plaintiffs’ intermodal claims failed due to distinct market dynamics, lack of parallel conduct, and even if there was parallel conduct, the evidence did not tend to exclude an inference of independent action.

United States v. Apple, Inc. (D.N.J. June 30, 2025): In this case alleging monopolization and attempted monopolization of the U.S. smartphone and performance smartphone markets in violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act and state antitrust laws, the court denied Apple’s motion to dismiss. Apple sought dismissal on the grounds that: (a) plaintiffs failed to allege exclusionary conduct, instead challenging lawful refusals to deal; (b) plaintiffs failed to allege substantial anticompetitive effects or monopoly power; (c) attempted monopolization claims lacked specific intent and dangerous probability; (d) various allegations (“monopoly playbook”) were irrelevant; and (e) plaintiff states lacked parens patriae standing. The court found that: (a) plaintiffs plausibly alleged monopoly power in the alleged relevant markets based on Apple’s 65–70% market share, high entry barriers, and consumer lock-in; (b) plaintiffs alleged technological and contractual restrictions on developers and smartphone users, not mere refusals to deal on competitors, making the refusal-to-deal doctrine inapplicable and sufficiently alleging anticompetitive conduct; (c) internal Apple communications supported specific intent, and market share plus exclusionary conduct sufficed to allege a dangerous probability; (d) the states adequately alleged quasi-sovereign interests to establish standing.

Celonis SE v. SAP SE (N.D. Cal. June 30, 2025): In this case alleging SAP engaged in various anticompetitive conduct in the U.S. market for process mining software in violation of, among other things, the Sherman Act and California’s antitrust statute, the court granted in part and denied in part defendants’ motion to dismiss. Defendants sought dismissal of the antitrust claims on the grounds that: (a) comity and forum non conveniens doctrines barred the case; (b) the tying claims failed to show how SAP’s policies effectively coerced customers into using its Signavio product; (c) the bundling and predatory pricing claims lacked sufficient detail regarding prices and costs to support below-cost pricing; and (d) the monopolization claims failed to allege exclusionary conduct beyond SAP’s refusal to support Celonis’s preferred data access methods. The court held that: (a) U.S. courts have a strong interest in resolving the domestic antitrust issues, and Germany is not an adequate alternative forum; (b) the tying claim failed because SAP’s alleged conduct did not amount to unlawful coercion; (c) the bundling and predatory pricing claims were inadequately pleaded because there were no allegations of below-cost pricing; and (d) the monopolization claims did not provide sufficient detail of anticompetitive conduct.

In re Turkey Antitrust Litig. (N.D. Ill. June 30, 2025): In this case alleging a conspiracy to fix turkey prices in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, the court denied defendants’ motion for summary judgment against direct-action plaintiff Carina Ventures LLC (a Burford Capital funding entity), which had acquired antitrust claims via assignment from Sysco Corporation. Defendants sought summary judgment on the grounds that: (a) Carina lacked standing to pursue antitrust claims as an assignee, and (b) public policy bars litigation funders from directly prosecuting antitrust claims acquired through assignment. The court held that (a) Carina had both Article III and antitrust standing as the valid assignee under well-established precedent, and (b) no federal statute, rule, or common law doctrine prohibits litigation funders from bringing claims via assignment—rejecting defendants’ attempt to invoke an implicit policy against such arrangements and declining to extend the champerty doctrine where it had been expressly disclaimed.

Walker v. NCAA (M.D. La. July 1, 2025): In this case alleging a violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act based on NCAA eligibility rules that count junior college (“JUCO”) competition against a four-season limit for Division II student-athletes—but not Division I—the court denied plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction. Plaintiff sought: (a) a preliminary injunction restoring his eligibility to compete in NCAA Division II basketball during the 2025–2026 season, and (b) an order enjoining the NCAA from enforcing JUCO Eligibility Limitation Bylaws against him. The court held that: (a) plaintiff failed to carry his burden to show irreparable harm, as his multi-year delay in bringing suit—despite knowing since 2022 that his eligibility would expire—rendered any urgency self-inflicted; and (b) plaintiff’s request for a mandatory injunction, which would disrupt rather than preserve the status quo, was especially disfavored and unjustified given the excessive and unexplained delay.

Class Action Certifications and Settlements

Corzo v. Brown Univ. (N.D. Ill. June 27, 2025): In this class action alleging that universities conspired to suppress institutional financial aid, the court granted final approval of a $16.75 million settlement with the California Institute of Technology. The certified class includes U.S. undergraduate students who received partial need-based aid and whose full cost of attendance was not covered, during any year from Fall 2019 to February 28, 2024, while enrolled at Caltech. The court also approved attorneys’ fees of approximately $5.58 million (one-third of the Caltech settlement fund), $1.22 million in expenses, and $1,250 service awards for each of the eight class representatives. No objections were received; students who submitted valid claims in prior settlements will be automatically included.

In re Broiler Chicken Antitrust Litig. (N.D. Ill. June 30, 2025): In this class action, the court granted final approval of settlements between the end-user consumer class and numerous chicken producers, totaling $22.35 million, with an aggregate recovery of $203 million across all settlement rounds. The certified class includes indirect purchasers of certain raw chicken products for personal use in 25 “Repealer Jurisdictions” from 2012 to 2019. The court also approved $9.9 million in expense reimbursements and $50,000 in service awards but deferred ruling on attorneys’ fees pending a related appeal. Notice reached over 28 million potential class members, more than 10.4 million claims were filed, and objections were minimal.

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If you have any antirust questions or would like more information about any of these matters, please contact one of the following authors:

Christian Lorenz Zach Martin  christian@kressinpowers.com zach@kressinpowers.com

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