Last Week in Antitrust Litigation (#014)

Week of June 16, 2025

Top Takeaways

1. Exclusionary access claims spotlight platform bottlenecks: VoIP-Pal’s claims against Apple and others reflect a growing trend of antitrust scrutiny targeting OS-level restrictions on third-party access to core device functionalities.

2. Reverse-payment litigation expands to cross-product settlements: The Teva litigation underscores evolving risk in “pay-for-delay” enforcement, especially where reciprocal generic delays are alleged to be masked through discrete public disclosures.

3. Cloud ecosystem dominance theory gains traction: The Gamboa ruling validates a market definition encompassing vertically integrated cloud services tied to specific hardware, expanding the frontier for Section 2 liability in tech.

   
   

New Cases Filed

VoIP-Pal.com Inc. v. Apple Inc. (D.D.C. June 11, 2025): VoIP-Pal.com Inc. filed a complaint alleging that Apple, Google (and parent Alphabet), and Samsung engaged in a scheme to exclude VoIP-Pal’s standalone Wi-Fi Calling technology in the U.S. telecommunications market in violation of, among other things, the Sherman Act and Clayton Act. The complaint asserts that defendants and their carrier co-conspirators structured mobile operating systems, firmware, and device access restrictions to deny VoIP-Pal and other independent VoIP providers equal access to essential smartphone infrastructure—such as native dialers, emergency calling, messaging systems, and telephony APIs—while providing those privileges to carrier-affiliated and internal services. VoIP-Pal alleges that this conduct created a closed, exclusionary infrastructure that foreclosed competition in the Wi-Fi Calling market, suppressed innovation and lower-cost alternatives, and entrenched a two-tier telecommunications system favoring bundled carrier plans. The company seeks structural remedies, treble damages, disgorgement, and attorneys’ fees and costs.

Pennington v. Teva Pharms. Indus., Ltd. (C.D. Cal. June 18, 2025): Plaintiffs filed a putative class action against Teva and several affiliates, alleging that Teva engaged in an unlawful “trade-for-delay” scheme with Mylan and Pfizer to delay generic competition for Nuvigil and the EpiPen in violation of, among other things, the Sherman Act and state antitrust laws. According to the complaint, Teva and Mylan allegedly agreed to delay launching their generic versions of the other’s brand-name drug—EpiPen and Nuvigil respectively—while structuring their patent infringement settlements to appear unrelated and avoid regulatory scrutiny, including by issuing separate press releases and concealing the coordination. Plaintiffs allege that this reciprocal delay suppressed competition for armodafinil (Nuvigil), causing purchasers to pay inflated prices and depriving them of lower-cost generics. Plaintiffs seeks class certification, treble damages, injunctive relief, and attorneys’ fees and costs.

Lincoln Mem'l Univ. v. Am. Veterinary Med. Ass'n (E.D. Tenn. June 18, 2025): Plaintiff alleges that the American Veterinary Medical Association (“AVMA”), through its accrediting arm, engaged in a conspiracy to suppress competition in the veterinary education market in violation of the Sherman Act. According to the complaint, AVMA imposed arbitrary, research-focused accreditation standards that disproportionately burden tuition-dependent schools like Plaintiff, placing Plaintiff’s Tennessee veterinary school on probation and threatening to deny accreditation to its planned Florida campus. Plaintiff alleges that AVMA’s actions are designed to restrict the number of veterinary graduates, thereby driving up prices for veterinary services and limiting access to veterinary education. Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief to bar AVMA’s restrictive accreditation practices, structural separation between AVMA and its accrediting body, and attorneys’ fees and costs.

Follow-on cases that were filed include:

• Hill v. NCAA (E.D. Ark. June 13, 2025) (alleging NCAA’s eligibility rules are anticompetitive like in Elad v. NCAA (D.N.J. Mar. 20, 2025))

• Walker v. NCAA (M.D. La. June 13, 2025) (same)

• Matrix Constr. LLC v. Rouse Servs. LLC (C.D. Cal. June 13, 2025) (alleging conspiracy to artificially increase construction equipment rental prices nationwide like in AXG Roofing, LLC v. RB Glob., Inc. (N.D. Ill. Apr. 1, 2025))

• Dipietro Constr. Corp. v. RB Golb., Inc. (N.D. Ill. June 18, 2025) (same)

• Child.’s Hosp. Corp. v. Blue Cross Blue Shield Ass’n (D. Mass. June 16, 2025) (alleging market allocation and price-fixing in health insurance industry like in CommonSpirit v. Blue Cross (N.D. Ill. Mar. 4, 2025))

• Mannino's Fam. Prac. Pharmacy v. GoodRx, Inc. (D.R.I. June 17, 2025) (alleging GoodRx engaged in price-fixing agreement with PBMs to share sensitive pricing information like in Keaveny Drug v. GoodRx (C.D. Cal. Oct. 30, 2024))

• Basinski v. Permian Res. Corp. (D.N.M. June 17, 2025) (alleging conspiracy to coordinate and constrain domestic shale oil production, fixing, raising, and maintaining the price of crude oil and derivative products like in In re Shale Oil Antitrust Litig. (D.N.M.))

Dispositive Orders and Verdicts

Goforth v. Transform Holdco LLC (W.D. Mo. June 12, 2025): In this case alleging enforcement of a non-compete provision that barred plaintiffs from operating a home and lawn store in Missouri violated Section 1 of the Sherman Act, the court granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment. Defendants sought summary judgment on the grounds that: (a) plaintiffs’ antitrust claim was a compulsory counterclaim that should have been raised in an earlier arbitration, and (b) the claim was barred by res judicata due to prior arbitration rulings. The court held that: (a) plaintiffs’ claim accrued by June 2019 when they first incurred damages defending against the non-compete, and the claim should have been raised in the first arbitration where the parties and factual core were the same, and (b) because the compulsory counterclaim ruling was dispositive, it declined to reach the res judicata argument.

Progress Rail Servs. Corp. v. Wabtec Ry. Electronics, Inc. (D. Del. June 12, 2025): In this case alleging, among other things, monopolization and attempted monopolization in the market for long-haul freight locomotives and electronic management systems (EMS) in violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act and Section 7 of the Clayton Act, the court granted defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiff’s antitrust claims. The court held that: (a) the Clayton Act claim was inadequately pled because the complaint relied on conclusory statements rather than specific factual allegations of post-acquisition harm; (b) the monopolization theory—based on a failure to assist a competitor—was barred by Verizon v. Trinko and therefore not legally cognizable; and (c) the attempted monopolization claim failed for the same reasons.

Gamboa v. Apple Inc. (N.D. Cal. June 16, 2025): In this case alleging unlawful monopolization of the market for cloud storage on Apple mobile devices in violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act, the court denied Apple’s motion to dismiss the second amended complaint. Apple sought dismissal on the grounds that: (a) plaintiffs failed to plausibly define a relevant market, (b) Apple lacked monopoly power, (c) plaintiffs failed to allege anticompetitive conduct, and (d) the claims were time-barred. The court held that: (a) plaintiffs plausibly alleged a relevant market encompassing all cloud storage on Apple mobile devices and sufficiently distinguished it from local storage, (b) Apple’s alleged 96.1% market share and barriers to entry and expansion supported a plausible inference of monopoly power, (c) plaintiffs sufficiently alleged anticompetitive conduct in the form of a technological tie between Apple devices and iCloud that excluded rivals, and (d) dismissal on statute of limitations grounds was premature given plausible allegations of a continuing violation and it being unclear when the claims accrued.

Land Trust No. 2020 Cont’l Ave. v. Watson Realty Corp. (S.D. Fl. June 16, 2025): In this case alleging a nationwide conspiracy to inflate home sale commissions through anticompetitive enforcement of Multiple Listing Service (“MLS”) rules in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, the court denied MVP Realty’s motion to dismiss. MVP sought dismissal on the ground that it qualified as a “Released Party” under a prior class action settlement because its 2022 transaction volume was $2 billion or less. The court held that MVP’s release status presented a disputed issue of fact, warranting further factual development.

Class Action Certifications and Settlements

In re Pork Antitrust Litig. (D. Minn. June 13, 2025): In this class action alleging price-fixing in the pork industry, the court issued two orders preliminarily approving settlements with Clemens Food Group, LLC and related entities. First, the court preliminarily approved a settlement between Clemens and the Commercial and Institutional Indirect Purchaser Plaintiffs, which maintains previously certified classes and expands the Damages Class to include Illinois as a repealer jurisdiction; the court authorized establishment of a qualified settlement fund and will address notice procedures in a later order. Second, the court preliminarily approved a settlement with Clemens and Hatfield Quality Meats on behalf of the Consumer Indirect Purchaser Plaintiffs, covering a certified class of consumers in 24 repealer jurisdictions who purchased certain raw pork products for personal use from 2014 to 2018; the court deferred notice to maximize efficiency and preserve settlement funds, with a notice plan to be submitted later.

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If you have any antirust questions or would like more information about any of these matters, please contact one of the following authors:

Christian Lorenz Zach Martin  christian@kressinpowers.com zach@kressinpowers.com

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