Last Week in Antitrust Litigation (#003)

Week of March 31, 2025

Top Takeaways

1. Data Platforms Under Fire for Facilitating Collusion: Antitrust suits allege companies used real-time pricing and occupancy data tools to align pricing and suppress competition—marking a sharp warning for tech-enabled coordination.

2. Employers Accused of Rigging Labor Markets: Wage-fixing and no-poach allegations in healthcare internships highlight growing risks for organizations that centralize hiring or share sensitive compensation data.

3. Courts Greenlight Monopoly Claims Against Big Pharma: Judges are letting lawsuits proceed against pharmaceutical companies accused of delaying cheaper generics and using legal threats to keep rivals out.

   
   

New Cases Filed

AXG Roofing, LLC v. RB Glob., Inc. (N.D. Ill. Apr. 1, 2025):  AXG Roofing filed a putative class action against RB Global, its subsidiary Rouse Services, and six of the nation’s largest construction equipment rental firms, alleging a horizontal price-fixing conspiracy in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act. According to the complaint, Rouse orchestrated a cartel by collecting granular, real-time pricing and utilization data from its rental company clients, pooling that competitively sensitive information, and disseminating a standardized price index—the “RRI Price”—which defendants used to coordinate higher rental prices. Plaintiffs claim that this scheme eliminated price competition, suppressed output, and enabled defendants to raise prices above competitive levels without fear of undercutting. The lawsuit seeks class certification, treble damages, injunctive relief, and attorneys’ fees and costs.

Amore v. Am. Ass’n of Veterinary Clinicians (W.D. Va. Apr. 2, 2025):  Plaintiffs, former veterinary interns, filed a putative class action alleging that a consortium of veterinary employers and industry organizations conspired to suppress wages and restrict competition in the labor markets for veterinary internships and residencies in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act. According to the complaint, defendants collectively required applicants to use a centralized matching system that eliminated negotiation, restricted job mobility, and enabled the exchange and publication of current, detailed compensation data, which plaintiffs allege was used to fix and stabilize pay. Plaintiffs allege that these restraints, including mandatory matching, no-poaching rules, and information-sharing agreements, artificially suppressed compensation and reduced competition for veterinary intern and resident positions. The plaintiffs seek class certification, treble damages, injunctive relief, and attorneys’ fees and costs.

TikTok Glob. LLC v. ByteDance Ltd. (S.D. Fl. Apr. 3, 2025):  TikTok Global filed suit against ByteDance, TikTok Inc., and Yiming Zhang alleging a conspiracy in violation of, among other things, Section 1 of the Sherman Act to block its legitimate bids to acquire TikTok’s U.S. operations. According to the complaint, defendants conspired to suppress TikTok Global’s $33.3 billion and later $58 billion CFIUS-compliant acquisition offers in favor of a non-divestiture “partnership” with Oracle, while falsely representing that arrangement as compliant with national security directives. Plaintiff contends this conduct constituted market allocation, bid rigging, and a concerted refusal to deal that unlawfully excluded TikTok Global from the bidding process and preserved ByteDance’s control over U.S. operations in violation of Executive Orders and federal antitrust laws. The complaint seeks treble damages, a permanent injunction requiring divestiture to TikTok Global, and other relief including punitive damages and attorneys' fees.

Hobbi v. 2U, Inc. (D.N.J. Apr. 3, 2025):  Salah Hobbi, a former employee of defendant, brought suit against 2U, Inc. alleging that the education technology company’s use and enforcement of non-compete, non-solicitation, and intellectual property assignment clauses violate, among others, Section 1 of the Sherman Act. The complaint claims that 2U imposed overly broad and coercive post-employment restrictions on employees—enforced even after eliminating the relevant business unit—and conditioned their waiver on the release of all legal claims, thereby suppressing labor mobility and competition. Plaintiff alleges that these restrictions harmed competition by preventing skilled professionals from re-entering the market, deterring innovation, chilling legal challenges, and perpetuating systemic age discrimination. The complaint seeks declaratory and injunctive relief invalidating the restrictive covenants, compensatory and trebled damages, and attorneys’ fees.

Walgreen Co. v. Teva Pharms. Indus. (D. Vt. Apr. 3, 2025):  Walgreen, Kroger, Albertsons, and H-E-B filed suit against Teva and its affiliates alleging that Teva unlawfully maintained a monopoly over the market for Copaxone and its generic equivalents in violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act. Plaintiffs allege that Teva engaged in a multifaceted scheme to suppress generic competition, including sham litigation, exclusionary contracts with PBMs and specialty pharmacies, a coercive product switch from 20mg to 40mg Copaxone, misinformation-fueled “Dispense as Written” campaigns, and illegal kickbacks to manipulate patient copays. Plaintiffs contend that this conduct allowed Teva to maintain inflated prices and market dominance even after generics became available, resulting in higher costs and reduced access to lower-priced alternatives. Plaintiffs seek a declaration that the conduct violates Section 2, trebled overcharge damages, permanent injunctive relief to unwind the effects of the scheme, and attorneys’ fees and costs.

The follow-on cases that were filed are:

• KPH Healhcare Servs. v. Takeda Pharm. Co. (N.D. Cal. Mar. 31, 2025) (alleging coordinated effort to limit competition in the Dexilant market through “reverse payment” and market allocation like in Walgreen Co. v. Takeda Pharm. Co. (N.D. Cal. Mar. 25, 2025))

• Ayer v. Zelis Healthcare, LLC (D. Kan. Mar. 31, 2025) (alleging conspiracy to suppress payments for out-of-network healthcare services like in Pac. Inpatient Med. Grp. v. Zelis Healthcare, LLC (D. Mass. Mar. 28, 2025))

• Danny Bachoua Chiropractic, APC v. Zelis Healthcare, LLC (N.D. Cal. Apr. 2, 2025) (same)

• Anderson v. Permian Res. Corp. (D.N.M. Mar. 31, 2025) (alleging conspiracy to coordinate and constrain domestic shale oil production, fixing, raising, and maintaining the price of crude oil and derivative products like in In re Shale Oil Antitrust Litig. (D.N.M.))

• C&C Drugs, Inc. v. CVS Caremark Corp. (S.D. Miss. Apr. 1, 2025) (alleging GoodRx and PBMs engaged in price-fixing agreement to share sensitive pricing information like in Keaveny Drug v. GoodRx, Inc. (C.D. Cal. Oct. 30, 2024))

• Superco Inc. v. CVS Caremark Corp. (S.D. Miss. Apr. 1, 2025) (same)

• Sw. Pharmacy, Inc. v. CVS Caremark Corp. (S.D. Miss. Apr. 1, 2025) (same)

• Duke Univ. Health Sys. v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield Ass’n (N.D. Ill. Apr. 2, 2025) (alleging market allocation and price-fixing in health insurance industry like in CommonSpirit v. Blue Cross (N.D. Ill. Mar. 4, 2025))

• Jenkins v. NCAA (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 5, 2025) (alleging NCAA’s conduct regarding players’ name, image, and likeness is anticompetitive like in In re Collegiate Athlete NIL Litig. (N.D. Cal.))

  
  

Dispositive Orders and Verdicts

Graham Packaging Co. v. Ring Container Techs. (W.D. Kent. Mar. 31, 2025): In this patent infringement case involving a counterclaim under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, the court denied Graham’s motion to dismiss, among others, the antitrust counterclaim. Graham sought dismissal of the antitrust counterclaim on two grounds: (a) failure to plead either a Walker Process fraud theory or a sham litigation theory, (b) failure to allege relevant markets and market power, and (c) failure to establish antitrust standing. The court held that Ring (a) sufficiently pleaded inequitable conduct, and as a result, adequately alleged a Sherman Act claim under a Walker Process fraud theory by alleging Graham intentionally withheld material prior art, misleading test data, and false declarations during patent prosecution, (b) adequately alleged a sham litigation theory as well, (c) sufficiently alleged a relevant market for PET containers and a submarket for PET containers for ketchup in the nationwide geographic market, (d) adequately alleged market power, and (e) established antitrust standing as a direct competitor allegedly harmed by exclusionary conduct aimed at suppressing competition in the relevant markets.

Tevra Brands, LLC v. Elanco Animal Health Inc. (N.D. Cal. Mar. 31, 2025): In this case alleging claims under Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act based on exclusive dealing and other conduct, the court granted Elanco’s motion to dismiss all claims without prejudice. Elanco moved to dismiss on multiple grounds: (a) that all claims were barred by res judicata due to a prior jury verdict against Tevra in a related action against Bayer, (b) that Tevra was collaterally estopped from reasserting the same antitrust market definition rejected by the Bayer jury, and (c) that the complaint failed to plausibly allege a relevant market, substantial foreclosure from exclusive dealing, unlawful maintenance of monopoly power, or a viable monopoly leveraging theory. The court held that (a) the claims were precluded because the Bayer and Elanco actions arose from the same transactional nucleus of facts, involved the same market definition, and Elanco was in privity with Bayer as its successor; (b) Tevra was collaterally estopped from relitigating the same market definition without alleging materially distinct facts; and (c) Tevra failed to plausibly allege a relevant market or facts to establish foreclosure sufficient to support its exclusive dealing claims, and that its monopoly leveraging claim failed for lack of facts supporting each of the required elements of such a claim.

Segal v. Amadeus IT Grp. (N.D. Ill. Mar. 31, 2025): In this putative class action alleging a hub-and-spoke conspiracy to exchange non-public occupancy data to facilitate supracompetitive pricing of luxury hotel rooms in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, the court granted the hotel defendants’ motion to dismiss. The hotel defendants moved to dismiss on three grounds: (a) the complaint failed to plausibly allege a conspiracy in restraint of trade; (b) the alleged conduct did not unreasonably restrain trade; and (c) plaintiff did not adequately allege antitrust injury. The court reached only the first argument, holding that (a) the plaintiff expressly disclaimed his hub-and-spoke conspiracy theory in his motion to dismiss briefing; and (b) his alternative unlawful information-sharing theory was contradictory and failed to plausibly allege anticompetitive effects.

Slackpass, Inc. v. Frosted, Inc. (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2025):  In this case asserting predatory pricing and attempted monopolization claims under, among others, Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act and state antitrust statutes, the court granted in part and denied in part defendants’ motion to dismiss the antitrust claims. Defendants sought dismissal of the antitrust claims on grounds that (a) the predatory pricing claims did not sufficiently allege that prices were below cost or a probability of recoupment, (b) the attempted monopolization claims did not sufficiently allege anticompetitive conduct, a specific intent to monopolize, or a dangerous probability of monopolization. The court held that (a) the predatory pricing claims failed because plaintiff did not plausibly allege prices below marginal cost or a dangerous probability of recoupment, (b) the attempted monopolization claims survived based on allegations of a proposed horizontal market allocation (exiting the market and allocating customers to a competitor) with a specific intent to monopolize a nascent market in which defendant had high comparable capital financing and other competitors had less than 10% market share.

In re Pork Antitrust Litig. (D. Minn. Mar. 31, 2025):  In this multidistrict litigation involving alleged price-fixing of the pork industry in violation of, among others, Section 1 of the Sherman Act and state antitrust statutes, the court issued a 232-page opinion granting in part and denying in part fourteen motions for summary judgment. Defendants sought summary judgment of the antitrust claims on the grounds that: (a) the plaintiffs’ theory of a price-fixing conspiracy was economically implausible and lacked sufficient evidence of such a conspiracy, (b) there was insufficient evidence to tie certain defendants to the price-fixing conspiracy, (c) the claims are time-barred, and (d) the rule of reason theory of a conspiracy fails for lack of an unreasonable restraint. The court held that: (a) there was ample evidence—including expert opinions—supporting the economic plausibility of the price-fixing conspiracy; (b) plaintiffs presented sufficient circumstantial evidence—including parallel conduct, plus factors, and expert analysis—to allow a reasonable jury to find a price-fixing conspiracy among the processor defendants; (c) the “slight evidence” rule does not apply, but the evidence against only Hormel was insufficient as to whether it joined the conspiracy (dismissing it from the case); (d) the statute of limitations on plaintiffs’ claims were equitably tolled by the continuing violations doctrine and fraudulent concealment; (e) the rule of reason theory had sufficient evidence of substantial anticompetitive effects and a genuine issue of material fact existed whether there were procompetitive benefits (warranting denial of summary judgment on this theory).

Foto Elec. Supply Co. v. Marut Enters. LLC (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 1, 2025): In this case asserting, among others, a Sherman Act claim, the court granted defendants’ motion to dismiss. The court held that plaintiff did not have standing to bring the antitrust claim and that plaintiff failed to sufficiently allege the relevant market and harm to competition.

State of Connecticut v. Aurobindo Pharma USA, Inc. (D. Conn. Apr. 1, 2025): In this multistate antitrust enforcement action concerning alleged price-fixing and collusion in the generic pharmaceuticals industry, the court granted final approval of a settlement between the plaintiff states and Heritage Pharmaceuticals, Emcure Pharmaceuticals, and Satish Mehta. The court found the settlement fair and reasonable, and it approved the use of the funds for settlement administration and continued litigation against remaining defendants. No objections were filed, and the court deferred approval of a restitution distribution plan until a future date to allow coordination with additional settlements. Eligible consumers who opted out by the February 13, 2025 deadline are excluded from the settlement benefits and releases.

In re Seroquel XR (Extended Release Quetiapine Fumarate) Antitrust Litig. (D. Del. Apr. 2, 2025):  In this case alleging violations of Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act based on a 2011 “reverse payment” settlement between AstraZeneca and Handa that allegedly delayed generic entry of Seroquel XR, the court denied defendants’ summary judgment motion. Defendants sought summary judgment on the ground that plaintiffs could not prove causation, arguing: (a) Plaintiffs lacked evidence that AstraZeneca would have agreed to include a supply option in an alternative settlement; (b) there was no evidence AstraZeneca would have licensed its patent earlier than November 2016; and (c) Plaintiffs’ expert’s model failed to account for Handa’s litigation risks. The court held that: (a) the real-world inclusion of a supply option supported a reasonable inference it would have been included in an alternative settlement; (b) Plaintiffs were not required to produce direct evidence of a but-for license and their expert’s model was supported by contemporaneous economic forecasts; and (c) the expert’s assumptions about litigation risk were addressed in a prior Daubert ruling and did not warrant summary judgment.

FTC v. Seven & I Holdings Co. (D.D.C. Apr. 7, 2025):  In this enforcement action alleging that 7-Eleven violated a 2018 consent order resolving antitrust allegations by failing to provide the required notice and approval before acquiring an interest in a retail fuel outlet, the court denied 7-Eleven’s motion to dismiss. 7-Eleven’s motion argued that the FTC lacked statutory authority to independently seek civil penalties under Section 5(l), which is a power exclusive to the Attorney General. The court rejected this argument, finding that the FTC may bring civil penalty actions under Section 5(l) so long as it complies with Section 16(a)’s requirements, including written notice to and consultation with the Attorney General and a 45-day waiting period.

Class Action Certifications and Settlements

In re Da Vinci Surgical Robot Antitrust Litig. (N.D. Cal. Mar. 31, 2025): In this putative antitrust class action alleging that Intuitive Surgical engaged in unlawful tying, exclusive dealing, and monopolization related to the aftermarket for EndoWrist instruments and servicing of its da Vinci surgical robots, the court granted class certification under Rule 23(b)(3) for damages and Rule 23(b)(2) for injunctive relief. The court found that plaintiffs demonstrated predominance of common issues through expert evidence suggesting that Intuitive Surgical’s contractual restrictions may have inflated prices and limited competition across the proposed class. The certified class includes all entities that purchased da Vinci service and EndoWrists from Intuitive Surgical in the U.S. between May 21, 2017, and December 31, 2021 (excluding hospitals run by the Departments of Defense and Veterans Affairs).

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If you have any antirust questions or would like more information about any of these matters, please contact one of the following authors:

Christian Lorenz Zach Martin  christian@kressinpowers.com zach@kressinpowers.com

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