Last Week in Antitrust Litigation (#069)

Week of July 13, 2026

Top Takeaways

1. Merger Enforcement Remains Front and Center: New challenges to the proposed Paramount–Warner Bros. transaction and the DOJ’s HSR enforcement action against Edwards Lifesciences demonstrate continued aggressive scrutiny of both substantive merger effects and compliance with premerger notification requirements.

2. Courts Continue to Demand Plausible Competitive Harm: Dismissals in the Under Armour, Treace, and yacht brokerage cases reinforce that plaintiffs must allege harm to competition—not merely injury to individual competitors—and support conspiracy claims with more than parallel conduct or industry custom.

3. Platform and Media Antitrust Litigation Continues to Advance: While the court narrowed Sensory v. Google to technology markets in which the plaintiff directly competed, it allowed core exclusionary conduct claims to proceed, and the court sustained DIRECTV's challenge to coordinated retransmission consent negotiations, signaling continued judicial willingness to entertain well-pleaded platform and media antitrust claims.

New Cases Filed

State of California v. Paramount Skydance Corp. (N.D. Cal. July 13, 2026) and Writers Guild of Am., W., Inc. v. Paramount Skydance Corp. (N.D. Cal. July 14, 2026): Several states and the Writers Guild of America, West, Inc. filed separate suits against Paramount Skydance and Warner Bros. alleging that Paramount’s proposed acquisition of Warner Bros. would substantially lessen competition in the markets for the distribution of wide-release theatrical films, the distribution of anticipated top-grossing theatrical films, the licensing of basic cable channels to distributors, and multiple labor markets for film and television writing services in violation of Section 7 of the Clayton Act. The complaints allege that the merger would eliminate direct competition between Paramount and Warner Bros. in negotiating with movie theaters, cable distributors, and writers, significantly increase concentration in each relevant market, enhance the combined company's bargaining leverage, reduce incentives to produce and distribute new theatrical films and invest in cable programming, suppress competition for writers' services, and facilitate coordinated conduct among the remaining major studios. According to the complaints, the merger would likely result in higher prices and more onerous licensing terms for movie theaters and cable distributors, reduced output, quality, innovation, and choice in theatrical films and basic cable programming, higher prices and reduced viewing options for consumers, lower compensation and fewer employment opportunities for writers, and a reduction in the quantity, variety, and quality of creative works.

United States v. Edwards Lifesciences Corp. (D.D.C. July 13, 2026): The United States filed suit against Edwards Lifesciences and Genesis MedTech alleging that defendants structured Edwards’ acquisition of JC Medical and a contemporaneous investment in Genesis to evade the premerger notification and waiting-period requirements of the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act by disguising consideration for the acquisition in violation of Section 7A of the Clayton Act. The complaint alleges that defendants agreed to a $115 million purchase price for JC Medical—below the then-applicable HSR reporting threshold—while contemporaneously arranging a $25 million investment in Genesis, intentionally treated the transactions separately to avoid HSR review, and consummated the acquisition without making the required filing or observing the statutory waiting period, thereby depriving the federal antitrust agencies of the opportunity to review the transaction before closing. Simultaneously with the complaint, the parties filed a proposed consent judgment under which Edwards would pay a $10 million civil penalty, Genesis would pay a $2 million civil penalty, Edwards would implement an antitrust compliance program and provide prior notice of specified future acquisitions involving transcatheter aortic valve replacement devices for aortic regurgitation, while both defendants denied wrongdoing and consented to entry of the judgment without trial. The proposed judgment also provides for compliance reporting, inspection and enforcement provisions, and resolves the United States’ claims for civil penalties and equitable relief arising from the challenged transaction, subject to approval under the Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act.

The follow-on cases that were filed are:

• Skalsky v. TikTok Inc. (C.D. Cal. July 13, 2026) (alleging conspiracy to monopolize sports memorabilia market like in GFC & Supply Inc. v. TikTok Inc. (C.D. Cal. Oct. 20, 2025))

• Valnet Inc. v. Google LLC (S.D.N.Y. July 13, 2026) (alleging Google monopolized the ad server and ad exchange markets like in United States v. Google LLC (E.D. Va. Jan. 24, 2023))

• City of Pittsburgh v. REV Grp. (E.D. Wis. July 13, 2026) (alleging defendants conspired to inflate the price of fire trucks like in City of La Crosse v. Oshkosh Corp. (E.D. Wis. Aug. 20, 2025)); City of Bellingham v. REV Grp. (E.D. Wis. July 14, 2026) (same)

• Harden v. Nutrien Ltd. (D. Kan. July 15, 2026) (alleging defendants conspired to fix the price of fertilizers like in Stevens v. Nutrien AG Sols. (N.D. Ill. Mar. 7, 2026))

Dispositive Orders and TROs

Multiple Energy Techs., LLC v. Under Armour, Inc. (W.D. Pa. July 13, 2026):  In this case alleging monopolization and attempted monopolization in the market for clothing containing recovery-enhancing bioceramics based on Under Armour’s alleged exclusion of a bioceramic-powder supplier through exclusive dealing, false advertising, and interference with business relationships in violation of, among others, the Sherman Act, the court granted summary judgment for Under Armour on the antitrust claims. The court reasoned that (a) plaintiff failed to establish antitrust injury or antitrust standing because the alleged conduct harmed plaintiff as a supplier rather than competition in the relevant market and any injury was too indirect and remote from the alleged monopolization, and (b) plaintiff failed to define a cognizable relevant product market or prove that Under Armour possessed market power.

DIRECTV, LLC v. Nexstar Media Grp. (S.D.N.Y. July 13, 2026): In this case alleging a conspiracy to fix retransmission consent fees in violation of Sherman Act § 1 through coordinated negotiations, information sharing, and the use of common negotiating agents for Big-4 broadcast television stations, the court denied defendants’ motion to dismiss. As for the antitrust claims, the court reasoned that the complaint plausibly alleged (a) a price-fixing conspiracy through allegations of coordinated negotiations, shared confidential information, common representation by the same negotiator, identical public messaging, and Nexstar’s economic control over its affiliated broadcasters, (b) relevant product and geographic markets consisting of retransmission consent rights for Big-4 broadcast stations in national and designated market area markets, (c) unreasonable restraints of trade under both the per se rule and the rule of reason, and (d) a standalone unlawful information-exchange claim based on defendants’ alleged sharing of confidential retransmission rates and negotiation information that resulted in higher prices and reduced output.

Sensory, Inc. v. Google LLC (D.D.C. July 13, 2026): In this case alleging Google’s use of exclusive Android distribution agreements to foreclose competition in markets for wake word technology, voice assistant technology, voice recognition software, general search, and related markets violated the Sherman Act, the court granted Google’s motion to dismiss in part. The court reasoned that (a) Sensory plausibly alleged antitrust standing and adequately defined markets for wake word technology, voice assistant technology, and voice recognition software used on Android smartphones and tablets because it competed directly with Google in those technology markets before Google’s allegedly exclusive distribution agreements foreclosed competition, (b) Sensory failed to establish antitrust standing or plausibly define markets for general search services, general search text ads, general search advertising, search access points, wake words, and voice assistants because it did not participate in those markets or alleged markets that were not cognizable for antitrust purposes, and (c) the Sherman Act tying claim and parallel D.C. antitrust claims survived only to the extent they were based on the four technology markets that remained in the case.

Treace Med. Concepts, Inc. v. Stryker Corp. (D.N.J. July 13, 2026): In this case alleging that Stryker and its subsidiary Wright Medical used their dominance in the trauma service line market to unlawfully bundle and tie tarsal-metatarsal (“TMT”) bunion correction systems in violation of  the Sherman Act and the New Jersey Antitrust Act, the court granted defendants’ motion to dismiss the antitrust claims without prejudice. The court reasoned that the antitrust claims should be dismissed for failing to plausibly allege antitrust injury because the complaint contained only conclusory assertions that defendants’ conduct increased prices, reduced quantity, or decreased quality in the relevant market while pleading concrete facts only about harm to Treace itself.

Ya Mon Expeditions, LLC v. Int'l Yacht Broker's Ass'n (S.D. Fl. June 14, 2026): In this putative class action alleging price-fixing and a concerted refusal to deal in violation of Sherman Act § 1 based on defendants’ alleged agreement to maintain uniform 10% yacht brokerage commissions and to refuse to accept for-sale-by-owner listings, the court granted defendants’ motion to dismiss. The court reasoned that (a) plaintiffs failed to plausibly allege an agreement because the complaint relied on nonbinding industry practices, standard form contracts, and parallel industry practices that did not support a reasonable inference of concerted action or plus factors under Twombly, (b) plaintiffs’ group-boycott claim likewise failed because the complaint alleged only defendants’ independent decisions to conduct business through licensed brokers rather than any agreement to refuse to deal with a particular customer or customers, and (c) the request for declaratory and injunctive relief necessarily failed because the underlying Sherman Act claims were dismissed.

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If you have any antirust questions or would like more information about any of these matters, please contact one of the following authors:

Christian Lorenz Zach Martin  christian@kressinpowers.com zach@kressinpowers.com

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